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I. INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act ('EMTALA" or "the Act")1 in 1986 to prevent hospitals from "dumping" patients due to an improper economic motive.2
Patient dumping occurs when a hospital emergency room either
refuses to admit an indigent and uninsured patient with an emer1.
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 &
Supp. 1993).
2.
Deficit Reductions Amendments of 1985, H.R. Rep. No. 99-241 (Part 1), 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 27 (1985).
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gency condition or improperly transfers this patient to another hospital.3 Congress enacted EMTALA in response to the widespread prac-

tice of hospitals dumping indigent and uninsured patients. 4 Yet despite the Act's explicit legislative intent to prevent patient dumping,
the language of EMTALA extends protection to "any individual" who
enters a hospital's emergency room. 5 Initially, EMTALA requires
hospitals to provide emergency patients with an "appropriate medical
screening examination."6 If the patient is diagnosed with an
"emergency medical condition," the hospital must either stabilize the
patient's condition or transfer the patient after fulfilling several
statutory requirements.7
As a result of the inconsistency between the Act's legislative
intent and its broad language, the federal courts have used two different standards to define a cause of action under EMTALA. Several
federal district courts have narrowly construed the Act in light of its
legislative history, allowing a cause of action only in cases involving
economic dumping. On the other hand, the federal circuit courts have
broadly applied EMTALA's statutory language, permitting "any individual" who alleges improper medical treatment to sue under the
statute. This judicial expansion of the Act has encroached upon other
federal laws enacted to remedy instances of non-economic discrimination.
economic
remedy
to
EMTALA
designed
Congress
discrimination against indigent and uninsured patients by hospitals;
yet, most federal courts have overlooked the Act's legislative purpose
by allowing paying patients to challenge their emergency treatment
3.
See Equal Access to Health Care: PatientDumping, H.R. Rep. No. 100-531, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988) (stating that the most common form of patient dumping "is the transfer
of a patient from one hospital emergency room to another for economic reasons, that is, lack of
insurance and inability to pay"); Karen I. Treiger, Note, Preventing Patient Dumping:
Sharpeningthe COBRA's Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1186, 1186-1187 (1986) (stating that patient
dumping occurs when a hospital sends a patient to another facility or simply turns the patient
away because the patient is unable to pay). Private hospitals have an economic incentive to
dump patients on public hospitals, which then bear the brunt of patient dumping. Id. at 1187.
See also 131 Cong. Rec. S13904 (October 23, 1985) (statement of Senator Kennedy) (stating that
public hospitals have reported a 400-percent rise in the number of uninsured patients who have
been transferred to their emergency rooms after visiting another hospital).
4.
H.R. Rep. No. 91-241 (Part 1) at 27 (cited in note 2).
5.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) applies to "any individual" who comes to a hospital's emergency
department. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) applies to "any individual" who comes to the hospital. 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1) applies to "an individual" at the hospital. Thus the Act's language does
not limit its protections to indigent and uninsured patients.
6.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a). See Treiger, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1209 (cited in note 3)
(pointing out that EMTALA's authorization through Medicare is curious since EMTALA's
requirements will have little effect on Medicare patients).
7.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)-(c).
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under the Act. Thus the federal courts have done little to improve
indigent patients' access to emergency care. Instead, most of the
judicial ink spilled interpreting EMTALA has involved the federal
standards of emergency care for paying patients.
In 1994, the Fourth Circuit handed down the surprising
opinion of In the Matter of Baby "K" ("Baby K'),8 which extended
EMTALA beyond any prior decision. This decision used EMTALA to
control the sensitive medical and ethical issues surrounding an infant
with anencephaly, a congenital birth defect. The Baby K court's
interpretation of EMTALA forced a Virginia hospital to stabilize the
infant's recurrent respiratory distress even though the hospital
considered the treatment medically and ethically inappropriate.9 The
Fourth Circuit's decision established a troubling precedent because
the Act was not designed to determine such specific treatment issues.
Notwithstanding the Act's clearly defined goal of improving access for
indigent patients, the court transformed EMTALA into an expansive
remedy for plaintiffs in search of medical treatment. Consequently,
this Note encourages Congress to amend the Act's language to Pnsure
that EMTALA addresses the dumping of indigent and uninsured
patients without controlling medical situations unforeseen by
Congress. Amending EMTALA will help the federal courts remedy
instances of economic discrimination against indigent and uninsured
patients without encroaching upon federal laws better designed to
control other types of discrimination.
Part II of this Note traces the history of EMTALA's enactment
and implementation to investigate the legislative intent supporting
the Act. Part III examines the federal courts' inconsistent application
of the Act and encourages the circuits that have not interpreted
EMTALA to adopt an approach that follows the legislative intent
more closely. Part IV discusses the Fourth Circuit's extension of
EMTALA in Baby K, illustrating how a broad application of the Act's
current language controls medical treatment decisions beyond the
Act's antidumping purpose. Part V presents some of the troubling
ethical and legal ramifications of Baby K and argues that the Fourth
Circuit's opinion extended EMTALA's protections into areas better
governed by federal laws such as the Rehabilitation Act,1o the

8.
9.
10.

16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 597.
29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1988 & Supp. 1993).
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Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")," and the Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984.12 To address these ramifications, Part VI
proposes an amendment to EMTALA that will remove the
inconsistency between the Act's anti-dumping purpose and its broad
statutory language.

II.

THE HISTORY OF EMTALA's ENACTMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

A. Legislative History
EMTALA was originally enacted as part of the Comprehensive
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 ("COBRA"). 13 The Act's
requirements apply to all hospitals that have entered into a Medicare
provider agreement. Prior to EMTALA's enactment, there were no
requirements concerning the appropriate treatment of emergency
patients in hospitals participating in Medicare. 14 During hearings on
this issue, the House Committee on Ways and Means received a
disturbing number of reports that hospital emergency rooms were
dumping uninsured patients in need of emergency medical treat-

11.
12.
13.

42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1988 & Supp. 1993).
42 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. (1988 & Supp. 1993).
Pub. L. No. 99-272 § 9121, 100 Stat. 82, 164-67 (1986). Although EMTALA is only one

section of COBRA, many courts and commentators have referred to EMTALA as COBRA. See,
for example, Nichols v. Estabrook, 741 F. Supp. 325, 329 (D. N.H. 1989) (using COBRA to
designate EMTALA); Deberry v. Sherman Hospital Association, 741 F. Supp. 1302, 1303 (N.D.
IlM. 1990) (pointing out that EMTALA is commonly referred to as COBRA although EMTALA is
only a small part of COBRA); Andrew J. McClurg, Your Money or Your Life: Interpretingthe
Federal Act Against Patient Dumping, 24 Wake Forest L. Rev. 173, 176 (1989) (stating that
COBRA was enacted to prevent patient dumping); Treiger, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1188 (cited in
note 3) (creating the confusion by abbreviating the new federal antidumping law as COBRA).
14. H.R. Rep. No. 99-241 (Part 1) at 27 (cited in note 2); 59 Fed. Reg. 32086, 32088 (1994).
The Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1988), was an earlier congressional attempt to force
hospitals receiving federal building funds to provide indigent patients with free or below-cost
health care. Despite its laudable intent, the Hill-Burton Act has been unsuccessful for several
reasons. First, Hill-Burton's requirements were unenforced from 1946 until 1972, when
Congress enacted enforcement provisions. Second, these enforcement provisions do not provide
punitive measures for violations. Third, the statute does not include an express private cause of
action for potential plaintiffs. For an extended discussion of Hill-Burton's ineffectiveness, see
Treiger, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1198-1200 (cited in note 3); Judith L. Dobbertin, Note, Eliminating
PatientDumping:A Proposalfor Model Legislation, 28 Valp. U. L. Rev. 291, 297-303 (1993).
Several states have enacted statutes that address patient dumping in a variety of ways. For
an exhaustive review of these laws, see Thomas L. Stricker, Jr., Note, The Emergency Medical
Treatment & Active LaborAct: Denial ofEmergency Medical CareBecause of ImproperEconomic
Motives, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1121, 1124 n.16 (1992); McClurg, 24 Wake Forest L. Rev. at
190-97 (cited in note 13).
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ment. 5 Consequently, the House version of EMTALA was drafted to
address these concerns. Once this version was introduced, the House
16
deliberation on EMTALA reflected the Act's antidumping intent.
The Senate deliberation on the Act also focused on patient
dumping and the need to ameliorate this problem. Senator David
Durenberger introduced the Senate version of EMTALA, stating that
the law "would require hospitals serving Medicare patients to provide
15. The Committee on Ways and Means noted its concern:
The Committee is greatly concerned about the increasing number of reports that
hospital emergency rooms are refusing to accept or treat patients with emergency
conditions if the patient does not have medical insurance. The Committee is most
concerned that medically unstable patients are not being treated appropriately. There
have been reports of situations where treatment was simply not provided. In numerous
other instances, patients in an unstable condition have been transferred improperly,
sometimes without the consent of the receiving hospital ... The Committee wants to
provide a strong assurance that pressures for greater hospital efficiency are not to be
construed as license to ignore traditional community responsibilities and loosen historic
standards.
H.R. Rep. No. 99-241 (Part 1) at 27 (cited in note 2). The Committee believed that patient
dumping may have worsened since Medicare's prospective payment system went into effect. Id.
Under the prospective payment system, the hospital is paid a predetermined amount for each
medical condition. If the hospital's treatment costs are less than the fixed sum, the hospital
profits from the surplus; however, if the hospital's treatment costs exceed the fixed sum, the
hospital absorbs the additional cost. Treiger, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1194 (cited in note 3). As a
result, efficient hospitals make more money, and thus the prospective payment system creates
an incentive to treat fewer indigent patients. Id.
The House Committee on the Judiciary reiterated the concerns of the Committee on Ways
and Means in its report, stating.
In recent years there has been a growing concern about the provision of adequate
emergency room medical services to individuals who seek care, particularly as to the
indigent and uninsured. Although at least 22 states have enacted statutes or issued
regulations requiring the provision of limited medical services whenever an emergency
situation exists, and despite the fact that many state court rulings impose a common law
duty on doctors and hospitals to provide necessary emergency care, some are not
convinced that the problem needs to be addressed by federal sanctions.
Section 124 of the Deficit Reduction Amendments of 1985 (Responsibility of Medicare Hospitals
in Emergency Cases), H.R. Rep. No. 99-241 (Part 3), 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1985) (citations
omitted).
16. 131 Cong. Rec. H9503 (Oct. 31, 1985) (statement of Representative Bilirakis).
Representative Bilirakis stated:
I introduced legislation which expresses the sense of the Congress that no person should
be denied emergency health care or hospital admittance because of a lack of money or
insurance. I firmly believe the American people should continue to expect that when
they see an emergency sign on a hospital or free standing clinic they can expect access to
emergency care. Unfortunately, there are countless examples where this isn't the case.
I am pleased that in the bill before us the thrust of my legislation has been included.
The quality ofAmerican health care is unparalleled throughout the world and it should
be the national policy for hospitals and free standing emergency centers to provide high
quality emergency care to all patients without discriminating on the grounds of
economic status, color, race, religion, sex, or national origin. Judging by the numbers of
cosponsors of my legislation this is a view shared by the majority of this body.
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emergency services to individuals with life-threatening or potentially
crippling conditions regardless of their ability to pay.' 17 Echoing this
sentiment, Senator Kennedy reported a four-hundred-percent rise in
the number of patients who were sent to the emergency rooms of
public hospitals after visiting another, often private, hospital. 18
Senator Dole then urged the Senate to "put an end to certain unsafe
practices, often referred to as 'patient dumping', whereby a hospital,
for purely financial reasons, refuses to initially treat or stabilize an
individual with a true medical emergency."' 9

17. 131 Cong. Rec. S13903 (Oct. 23, 1985). Senator Durenberger's statements exclusively
addressed patient dumping:
[The practice of rejecting indigent patients in life threatening situations for economic
reasons alone is unconscionable.
All Americans, rich or poor, deserve access to quality health care....
At the same time while we in the Congress and the State legislatures are groping
for areas to get quality health care to the uninsured Americans, we cannot stand idly by
and watch those Americans who lack the resources be shunted away from immediate
and appropriate emergency care whenever and wherever it is needed. The purpose of
this amendment is to send a clear signal to the hospital community, public and private
alike, that all Americans, regardless of wealth or status, should know that a hospital
will provide what services it can when they are truly in distress.
Whatever additional steps GAO recommends, whether further Medicare action or
refinements in Medicaid, the aim of Congress should be to encourage States to take
definite action to guard against "dumping" at the local level.
Id. at S13903-04.
18. Id. at S13904. Senator Kennedy's remarks also reflected his concern over patient
dumping:
[Disturbing reports have surfaced about individuals who have been denied emergency
services at hospitals in many locations around the country. They have been denied
services because they lacked health insurance or funds to pay cash at the door. In some
cases, racial discrimination may have been involved.
These patients have been denied the care they need. Some have been sent to
another hospital-usually a public hospital. This practice is often called patient
dumping....
[Situdies done by physicians have documented the danger of this inexcusable
practice; death and disability have clearly been the result....
We cannot allow a health care system as advanced as ours to provide emergency
care only to those who can pay. This amendment will ensure that hospitals live up to
their fundamental responsibilities to the public.
Id.
19. Id. Senator Heinz then stated, "I am pleased to join my colleagues.., as a cosponsor
of this amendment to . . . [COBRA], addressing the critical problem of hospital emergency
department dumping of the medically uninsured.... Mr. President, the amendment offered
today... takes a major step toward preventing the 'dumping' of emergency patients." Id. at
S13904-05. Senator Proxmire echoed this sentiment, stating: "I am delighted to join as a
cosponsor of this antidumping amendment .... This amendment deals with one of the most
egregious abuses [of Medicare's prospective payment system]: The refusal of hospitals with
emergency rooms to provide emergency treatment for critically ill patients or women in labor."
Id. at S13905.
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As the legislative history reveals, there is no question the
legislative purpose behind EMTALA was to prohibit Medicare hospitals from dumping patients due to an improper economic motive. In
addition, virtually all federal courts as well as several commentators
have agreed that Congress enacted EMTALA to address patient
dumping. 20 In spite of Congress's clear antidumping intent, EMTALA
20. See Power v. Arlington HospitalAss'n, 43 F.3d 851, 856 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that
Congress enacted EMTALA to address a growing concern with patient dumping); Holcomb v.
Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 n.2 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that EMTALA was enacted to prevent
patient dumping); Delaney v. Cade, 986 F.2d 387, 391 n.5 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that Congress
designed the Act to end patient dumping); Brooker v. Desert Hospital Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 414
(9th Cir. 1991) (finding that the legislative history indicates that Congress intended the Act to
prevent hospitals from dumping patients who lack insurance coverage); Gatewood v.
Washington HealthcareCorp., 933 F.2d 1037, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding that EMTALA was
designed principally to address the problem of patient dumping); Cleland v. Bronson Health
Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that "there isnothing in the
legislative history showing that Congress had any concern about the treatment accorded any
patients other than the indigent and uninsured"); Slabik v. Sorrentino, 891 F. Supp. 235, 236
(E.D. Pa. 1995) ("EMTALA was enacted... amid growing concerns of inadequate emergency
room care for poor and uninsured patients'); Keating v. TangipahoaHospital Dist. No. 1, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2559, *2 (E.D. La.) (stating that EMTALA prohibits patient dumping);
Reynolds v. Mercy Hospital, 861 F. Supp. 214, 219 (W.D. N.Y. 1994) (finding .that Congress
enacted EMTALA in response to the growing concern that hospitals were dumping patients who
were unable to pay); Lane v. Calhoun-Liberty County Hospital Association, Inc., 846 F. Supp.
1543, 1549 (N.D. Fla. 1994) (stating that the legislative history of the Act evinces a concern for
patient dumping); Griffith v. Mt. CarmelMedical Center, 842 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 n.4 (D.Kan.
1994) (stating that EMTALA was enacted to stop patient dumping); Ruiz v. Kepler, 832 F. Supp.
1444, 1447 (D. N.M. 1993) (stating that EMTALA's legislative history reflects an unmistakable
concern for the treatment of indigent and uninsured persons); Hines v. Adair County Public
Hospital, 827 F. Supp. 426, 428 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (finding that the Act proscribes patient
dumping, "a phenomenon exacerbated by increasing economic pressures upon for-profit
hospitals"); Coleman v. McCurtainMemorial Medical Management, 771 F. Supp. 343, 345 (E.D.
Okla. 1991) (stating that Congress enacted EMTAIA to address and alleviate the problem of
patient dumping); Owens v. Nacogdoches County Hospital District, 741 F. Supp. 1269, 1271-72
(E.D. Tex. 1990) (stating that the Act was a congressional response to a national epidemic of
patient dumping); Evitt v. University Heights Hospital, 727 F. Supp. 495, 497 (S.D. Ind. 1989)
(stating that EMTALA's legislative purpose is specifically directed toward preventing patient
dumping); Thompson v. St. Anne's Hospital, 716 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (finding that
EMTALA's legislative history 'indicates that the statute is aimed at preventing hospitals not
only from transferring indigent patients but also from simply rejecting them"); Nichols, 741 F.
Supp. at 330 (finding that the congressional intent was "to provide some assurance that patients
with emergency medical conditions will be examined and treated regardless of their financial
resources"); Bryant v. Riddle Memorial Hospital, 689 F. Supp. 490, 491 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (stating
that EMTALA was enacted in order to combat the growing problem of patient dumping); Pamela
K. Epp, Note, Medical Care: In Defense of the Masses-An Interpretation of the Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active LaborAct: In Re Baby K, 28 Creighton L. Rev. 1209, 1220 (1995)
("EMTALA's legislative history clearly reveals that Congress intended to prevent patient
dumping for economic reasons"); Mary Jean Fell, Note, The Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act of 1986: Providing Protection from Discriminationin Access to Emergency
Medical Care, 43 Cath. U. L. Rev. 607, 608-609 (1994) (showing that Congress enacted EMTALA
to prevent patient dumping in response to highly publicized incidents); Dobbertin, 28 Valp. U. L.
Rev. at 303 (cited in note 14) (stating that the most recent federal attempt to solve the patient
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was enacted without reference to a patient's indigence or lack of insurance. Thus the Act's broad statutory language is inconsistent with
its legislative history. Presumably Congress did not limit the Act's
application to indigent patients because it believed hospitals would
have no economic incentive to dump paying patients. However, extending EMTALA's protections to any emergency patient controls
situations beyond the Act's legislative purpose. While indigent and
uninsured patients can use EMTALA to remedy instances of economic
discrimination, paying patients can also use the Act's requirements to
create a federal standard of emergency care.
B. The StatutoryRequirements of EMTALA
To guarantee all emergency patients equal treatment,
Congress drafted the Act to apply to "any individual" who arrives at a
hospital with an emergency condition. 21 While this language certainly
applies to indigent and uninsured patients, EMTALA's language covers a far larger class of potential patients than is indicated in the
Act's legislative history. In other words, although the Act's language
effectuates Congress's anti-discriminatory intent, 22 EMTALA's
application to "any individual" protects patients who are not indigent
and uninsured. This inherent inconsistency between the Act's
legislative history and its statutory language is the source of judicial
confusion over the Act's application.
EMTALA contains three distinct requirements. 23 First, under
section 1395dd(a), the hospital24 must provide every emergency pa-

dumping problem is EMTALA); Stricker, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 1121, 1129 (cited in note 14)
(showing that the Act's legislative history clearly indicates that Congress enacted EMTALA to
remedy incidents in which patients were denied emergency care due to an improper economic
motive); Wayne Edward Ramage, Note, The PariahPatient: The Lack of Funding for Mental
Health Care, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 951, 960 (1992) (stating that the Act was Congress's response to
the increasing problem of patient dumping); McClurg, 24 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 175-76 (cited in
note 13) (stating that EMTAIA is directed at curbing patient dumping); Treiger, 61 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. at 1206-07 (cited in note 3) (showing that EMTALA's antidumping provisions were enacted
in response to congressional concern over patient dumping).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a), (b)(1), (c)(1). See also H.R. Rep. No. 99-241 (Part 3) at 5 (cited
in note 15) (stating that EMTALA applies to all individuals for whom care is sought, regardless
of whether the patient is covered by Medicare); 131 Cong. Rec. S13904 (Oct. 23, 1985) (remarks
of Senator Durenberger) (stating that EMTALA's purpose is to send a signal to hospitals that all
Americans should be provided emergency care regardless of their wealth or status).
22. For the broadest legislative statement of EMTALA's anti-discriminatory intent see 131
Cong. Rec. H9503 (Oct. 31, 1985) (remarks of Representative Bilirakis) (stating that EMTALA
should be a national policy requiring hospitals to provide emergency care without
discriminating on the basis of economic status, color, race, religion, sex, or national origin).
23. See 131 Cong. Rec. S13904 (Oct. 23, 1985) (remarks of Senator Kennedy)
(summarizing EMTALA's three requirements); H.R. Rep. No. 99-241 (Part 3) at 6-7 (cited in
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tient with an appropriate medical screening to determine whether the
patient has an emergency medical condition. 25 Second, if the medical
screening reveals that an emergency medical condition exists, the
hospital must then provide the patient with treatment necessary to
stabilize this condition. 2 The definition of the phrase "to stabilize"
reflects the presumption that a hospital will transfer all unprofitable
patients; therefore, the hospital must provide the emergency patient
with "such medical treatment of the condition as may be necessary to
assure, within reasonable medical probability, that no material deterioration of the condition is likely to result from or occur during the
note 15) (stating that individual patients can sue hospitals for failing to appropriately screen,
stabilize, or properly transfer them).
24. The term "hospital" includes a rural primary care facility. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(5).
25. Section 1395dd(a) states:
In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any individual...
comes to the emergency department and a request is made on the individual's behalf for
examination or treatment for a medical condition, the hospital must provide for an
appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital's
emergency department, including ancillary services routinely available to the
emergency department, to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition ...
exists.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (emphasis added). The term "emergency medical condition" is defined
as:

(A)

a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity
(including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could
reasonably be expected to result in(i)
placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the
health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy, or
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii)serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; or
(B)
with respect to a pregnant women [sic] who is having contractions(i)
that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another hospital before
delivery, or
(ii) that transfer may pose a threat to the health or safety of the woman or the
unborn child.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1). See Treiger, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1210 (cited in note 3) (encouraging
Congress to replace EMTALA's current definition of emergency medical condition with a more
comprehensive definition formerly used by the American College of Emergency Physicians);
Ramage, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at 961 (cited in note 20) (same).
26. Section 1395dd(b)(1) states:
If any individual... comes to a hospital and the hospital determines that the individual
has an emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide either(A) within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for such further
medical examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the
medical condition, or
(B) for transfer of the individual to another medical facility in accordance with
subsection (c) of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1) (emphasis added). If the patient refuses to consent either to treatment
or to transfer, the hospital satisfies the stabilization requirements of § 1395dd(b)(1). 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd(b)(2)-(3). In these situations, the hospital should take all reasonable steps to secure the
patient's written informed consent. Id.
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transfer of the individual from a facility.' '27 Third, the hospital may
transfer2s an unstabilized patient to another facility provided several
statutory requirements are satisfied.29

27. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A). If the emergency patient is pregnant and delivery is
imminent, the hospital must deliver her child in order to stabilize her. Id.
28. The term "transfer" is defined as:
the movement (including the discharge) of an individual outside a hospital's facilities at
the direction of any person employed by (or affiliated or associated, directly or indirectly,
with) the hospital, but does not include such movement of an individual who (A) has
been declared dead, or (B) leaves the facility without the permission of any such person.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(4).
29. Section 1395dd(c)(1) states:
If an individual at a hospital has an emergency medical condition which has not been
stabilized ....the hospital may not transfer the individual unless-(A) (i) the individual (or a legally responsible person acting on the individual's
behalf) after being informed of the hospital's obligations under this
section and of the risk of transfer, in writing requests transfer to another
medical facility,
(ii) a physician . . . has signed a certification that[,] based upon the
information available at the time of transfer, the medical benefits
reasonably expected from the provision of appropriate medical treatment
at another medical facility outweigh the increased risks to the individual
and, in the case of labor, to the unborn child from effecting the transfer,
or
(iii) if a physician is not physically present in the emergency department at
the time an individual is transferred, a qualified medical person.., has
signed a certification described in clause (ii) after a physician . . . in
consultation with the person, has made the determination described in
such clause, and subsequently countersigns the certification; and
(B)
the transfer is an appropriate transfer.., to that facility.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c) (emphasis added).
The term "stabilized" is defined to mean that:
no material deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable medical
probability, to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a facility,
or, with respect to an emergency medical condition described in paragraph (1)0B), that
the woman has delivered (including the placenta).
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(B).
An appropriate transfer to a medical facility is a transfer(A) in which the transferring hospital provides the medical treatment within its
capacity which minimizes the risks to the individual's health and, in the case
of a woman in labor, the health of the unborn child;
(3) in which the receiving facility(i) has available space and qualified personnel for the treatment of the
individual, and
(ii) has agreed to accept transfer of the individual and to provide appropriate
medical treatment;
(C) in which the transferring hospital sends to the receiving facility all medical
records (or copies thereof), related to the emergency condition for which the
individual has presented, available at the time of transfer, including records
related to the individual's emergency medical condition, observations of signs
or symptoms, preliminary diagnosis, treatment provided, results of any tests
and the informed written consent or certification (or copy thereof) provided
under paragraph (1)(a), and the name and address of any on-call physician...
who has refused or failed to appear within a reasonable time to provide
necessary stabilizing treatment;
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Accordingly, a potential private plaintiff may sue under
EMTALA if the hospital fails to follow any one of the Act's three requirements. 30 In other words, an EMTAIA cause of action is proper if
a plaintiff alleges one or more of the following: (1) the hospital failed
to provide an "appropriate medical screening examination" and therefore failed to discover the patient's "emergency medical condition"; (2)
after determining the patient had an "emergency medical condition,"31
the hospital failed "to stabilize" the patient's condition before transfer;
or (3) after determining the patient had an "emergency medical condition" and before the condition was "stabilized," the hospital transferred the patient without fulfilling the statutory transfer require32

ments.

(D) in which the transfer is effected through qualified personnel and
transportation equipment, as required including the use of necessary and
medically appropriate life support measures during the transfer; and
(E) which meets such other requirements as the Secretary may find necessary in
the interest of the health and safety of individuals transferred.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2).
30. See Urban v. King, 43 F.3d 523, 526 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that a plaintiff does not
have to prove that the hospital violated the screening requirements of § 1395dd(a) in order to
succeed in an action brought under the transfer requirements of § 1395dd(c)).
31. EMTALA's stabilization and transfer requirements are triggered only after the
hospital diagnoses the patient with an emergency medical condition. See, for example, Baber v.
Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872, 883 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Act's plain
language requires actual knowledge of the patient's emergency medical condition); Gatewood,
933 F.2d at 1041 (stating that the stabilization and transfer requirements "are triggered only
after a hospital 'determines that an individual has an emergency medical condition' ") (quoting §
1395dd(b)); Coleman, 771 F. Supp. at 346 (concluding that "a plain reading of the Act dictates
that the provisions concerning stabilization and transfer are implicated only after the hospital
determines that an emergency medical condition exists').
32. It is important to emphasize EMTALA's three separate requirements and their
attendant causes of action because many federal courts have misunderstood these
requirements. Some federal courts mistakenly believe that EMTALA prevents hospitals from
transferring patients before they are stabilized, when in fact, § 1395dd(c) explicitly allows
hospitals to transfer unstabilized patients provided the statutory transfer requirements are
satisfied. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 32100 (stating, "the Act permits an unstabilized individual to be
transferred" if the statutory transfer requirements are satisfied); id. at 32104 (stating that the
Act "does not regulate the transfer of stabilized individuals'). In fact, another portion of the Act
explicitly supports the conclusion that unstabilized patients may be transferred if a physician
authorizes the transfer. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(i) (preventing a hospital from taking adverse action
against a physician who refuses to authorize the transfer of an unstabilized patient). The
confusion over unstabilized transfers may be the direct result of the inaccurate title of §
1395dd(c): "Restricting transfers until individual stabilized." See note 200 and accompanying
text (proposing an amendment to EMTALA to correct this confusion). Consequently, many
courts have mistakenly interpreted § 1395dd(c) to prevent unstabilized transfers. See Holcomb,
30 F.3d at 117 (stating that, in order to succeed on a § 1395dd(b) claim, the plaintiff must
present evidence that the patient was not stabilized before being transferred); Collins v. DePaul
Hospital, 963 F.2d 303, 305 (10th Cir. 1992) (reading EMTALA to prevent hospitals from
transferring patients if their medical condition has not been stabilized); Brooker, 947 F. Supp. at
415 (erroneously stating that the Act prevents hospitals from transferring patients unless they
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EMTALA's statutory requirements implicitly reflect an antidumping purpose since the Act's language presumes all emergency
patients covered by the Act will be transferred. Once an emergency
patient is diagnosed with an emergency medical condition, the hospi-

tal can either provide the patient with treatment that will prevent

33
any material deterioration of the patient's condition during transfer,
or the hospital can transfer the patient in an unstabilized condition
provided all transfer requirements are satisfied. 34 EMTALA's presumption that all non-paying emergency patients will be transferred
is consistent with the Act's congressional intent to protect indigent
patients from dangerous transfers. 35 When the patient is able to pay,
EMTALA's requirements become irrelevant because the hospital will
not transfer the patient. 6 Instead, economic incentive will provide
the impetus for the hospital to stabilize the patient's emergency condition, and the hospital will admit the patient for further care.
Therefore, EMTALA operates only in circumstances in which the
hospital is determined to transfer an emergency patient, and these

are stabilized); Reynolds, 861 F. Supp. at 220 (concluding that EMTALA restricts the transfer of
an unstabilized patient); Owens, 741 F. Supp. at 1272 (stating that the Act provides that
emergency patients cannot be transferred to another facility in an unstable condition).
Many federal courts also mistakenly believe EMTALA contains only two requirements. See
Brooks u.Maryland General Hospital Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1994) (concluding that
EMTALA imposes two duties upon every Medicare hospital: (1) to provide every emergency
patient with an appropriate medical screening examination, and (2) to stabilize any emergency
medical condition or to transfer the person to another facility if the benefits outweigh the risks);
Urban, 1994 WL 617521 at 2 (stating that all Medicare hospitals face two requirements under
the Act: (1) the screening requirements under § 1395dd(a), and (2) the transfer requirements
under § 1395dd(c)); Cleland, 917 F.2d at 268 (finding that EMTALA imposes two duties upon
hospitals:
(1) the screening requirements under § 1395dd(a), and (2) the stabilization
requirements under § 1395dd(b)); Lane, 846 F. Supp. at 1549 (concluding that EMTALA, at
heart, imposes two duties upon hospitals under § 1395dd(a) and (b)); Cooper, 839 F. Supp. at
1541 (stating that the Act imposes two duties: screening and stabilization); Griffith, 831 F.
Supp. at 1537 (stating that most courts have interpreted the Act to create two duties giving rise
to two different claims: "improper screening examination" and "transfer before stabilization");
Hines, 827 F. Supp. at 431 (stating that the Act imposes two duties upon emergency rooms:
screening and stabilization); Deberry, 741 F. Supp. at 1305 (stating that the hospital can violate
EMTALA by either using inadequate screening procedures or by falling to stabilize the patient's
condition). But see Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1040-41 (distinguishing clearly between EMTALA's
three statutory requirements: screening, stabilization, and transfer); Romo v. Union Memorial
Hospital,Inc., 878 F. Supp. 837, 841 (W.D. N.C. 1995) (same).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c).
35. 131 Cong. Rec. S13904 (statement of Senator Dole) (stating that EMTALA only
requires a hospital to provide "an adequate first response to a medical crisis" by evaluating the
patient and giving "whatever medical support services and[ I transfer arrangements" are
necessary to protect the patient's well-being).
36. This will be true in most cases. Some situations will require the transfer of paying
patients, however, such as when a hopital transfers an emergency patient to another hospital
with specialized facilities like a burn unit.
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circumstances most often arise when indigent and uninsured emergency patients come to private hospitals.
The Act provides for enforcement through civil monetary penalties and civil legal actions. Monetary penalties can be assessed
against the hospital and the physician. Any hospital that "negligently
violates" the Act's requirements is subject to a maximum penalty of
$50,000. 37 Any physician "who is responsible for the examination,

treatment, or transfer of an individual in a participating hospital" and
who "negligently violates" the Act's requirements is subject to a
maximum penalty of $50,000.38

If the physician's violation is "gross

and flagrant or is repeated," the physician can be excluded from
federal and state health care programs.39
Civil legal actions can either be brought by an individual
against a hospital, 40 or by one hospital against another.41 The dam37. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A). A hospital with less than 100 beds can only be fined a
maximum of $25,000. Id.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B). For a case interpreting the provisions of this subsection,
see Burditt v. United States Departmentof Health and Human Services, 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir.
1991) (fining a physician $20,000 for improperly transferring a hypertensive woman in labor).
This subsection also covers a physician who:
(i)
signs a certification under subsection (c)(1)(A) of this section that the medical
benefits reasonably to be expected from a transfer to another facility outweigh the
risks associated with the transfer, if the physician knew or should have known
that the benefits did not outweigh the risks, or
(ii) misrepresents an individual's condition or other information, including a hospital's
obligations under this section.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B). In addition, section § 1395dd(d)(1)(C) provides that:
If, after an initial examination, a physician determines that the individual requires the
services of a physician listed by the hospital on its list of on-call physicians . . . and
notifies the on-call physician and the on-call physician fails or refuses to appear within a
reasonable period of time, and the physician orders the transfer of the individual
because the physician determines that without the services of the on-call physician the
benefits of transfer outweigh the risks of transfer, the physician authorizing the transfer
shall not be subject to a penalty under subparagraph (B). However, the previous
sentence shall not apply to the hospital or to the on-call physician who failed or refused
to appear.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(C).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)0B).
40. Individual plaintiffs do not have a cause of action against physicians under EMTALA. See
H.R Rep. No. 99-241 (Part 3) at 6-8 (cited in note 15) (stating that private actions for damages can only
be brought against the hospital). See, for example, Delaney, 986 F.2d at 394 (holding that individuals
can bring civil actions only against hospitals under EMTALA); Baber, 977 F.2d at 877 (finding that
EMTALA does not allow a private individual to recover personal injury damages from a physician);
Lane, 846 F. Supp. at 1549 (declining to follow the only case that has implied a cause of action against
individual physicians); Ballachino v. Anders, 811 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. N.Y. 1993) (stating that
there is no private cause of action against individual physicians under EMTALA). But see Sorrells v.
Babcock, 733 F. Supp. 1189, 1194 (N.D. ill. 1990) (holding that the Act creates a private cause of action
against individual physicians).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A)-(B).
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ages available to an individual plaintiff are limited to state personal
injury awards. 42 A hospital suffering a financial loss directly resulting
from another hospital's violation of the Act can obtain damages under
the law of the state in which the hospital is located.

' 43

EMTALA has a two year limitation on civil actions,44 and the
Act does not preempt any State or local law unless that law directly
conflicts with the Act's requirements. 45 Moreover, hospitals with
specialized capabilities cannot discriminate against transfers.46
Finally, the Act's last two sections prevent hospitals from delaying
examination or treatment to determine a patient's method of payment
or insurance status47 and from taking adverse actions against whistle8

blowers.4

42. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A). Because this subsection limits a plaintiffs recovery to the
personal injury damages recoverable in the state, many federal courts have applied state limits
on medical malpractice damages to EMTALA claims. See, for example, Power, 42 F.3d at 861
(concluding that Virginia's medical malpractice cap applied to the plaintiffs EMTALA claim
because the cap would have applied if the case had been brought under Virginia law); Reid v.
Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hospital, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 853, 855 (S.D. Ind. 1989)
(concluding that a strict interpretation of EMTALA's "personal injury" damage limit would
render this clause effectively meaningless since no states limit personal injury damages); Lee v.
Alleghany Regional Hospital Corp., 778 F. Supp. 900, 903-04 (W.D. Va. 1991) (following Reid
and applying Virginia's $1 million cap on medical malpractice recovery to an EMTALA claim).
But see Cooper, 839 F. Supp. at 1542-43 (holding that EMTALA and state medical malpractice
laws provide distinct remedies for different wrongs).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(B). See Fell, 43 Cath. U. L. Rev. at 623 n.110 (cited in note
20) (stating that this provision has not been utilized because hospitals are unwilling to turn in
another hospital for a violation).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(C). Despite this subsection, at least one court has applied a
state's one-year tort claim notice requirement to an EMTALA action. Draperv. Chiapuzio, 9
F.3d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs action because he failed
to comply with Oregon's one-year notice requirement for wrongful death actions against a public
body). But see Power, 42 F.3d at 865-66 (holding that Virginia's notice of claim provision
directly conflicts with EMTALA); Reid, 709 F. Supp. at 854-55 (refusing to incorporate state
procedural limitations on a federal cause of action); Cooper, 839 F. Supp. at 1543 (following Reid
in finding that the plaintiffs EMTALA claim does not have to follow Florida's pre-suit
procedures).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f). See Brooks, 996 F.2d at 714-15 (stating that Congress never
intended to preempt state malpractice law; rather, "it was filling a gap in the state law and
imposing a limited duty on hospitals with emergency rooms to provide emergency care to all
individuals who come there); Deberry, 741 F. Supp. at 1307 (analyzing EMTALA's preemption
requirements and concluding that the Act provides for conflict preemption rather than field
preemption); Treiger, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1209 (cited in note 3) (stating that EMTALA imposes
federal emergency care standards on the states).
46. 42 U.S.C. §1395dd(g). Hospitals with specialized capabilities are those with units such
as burn units, shock-trauma units, or neonatal intensive care units. Id.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(h). This subsection states: "A participating hospital may not delay
provision of an appropriate medical screening examination ... or further medical examination
and treatment ... in order to inquire about the individual's method of payment or insurance
status." Id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(i). This subsection states:
A participating hospital may not penalize or take adverse action against a qualified
medical person ... or a physician because the person or physician refuses to authorize
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C. EMTALA's Implementation
In 1988, the House Committee on Government Operations
conducted hearings on EMTALA's implementation. The Committee
exclusively addressed EMTAIA's antidumping intent as indicated by
the title of its report-Equal Access to Health Care: Patient
Dumping.49 After describing numerous cases of egregious dumping
practices across the country, the Committee found that the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") failed to issue
regulations implementing EMTALA, placing thousands of patients at
risk.50 The Committee also found that the Health Care Financing
Administration ("HCFA") was not enforcing the Act's monetary
penalties against violators, and neither hospitals, physicians, nor
patients were notified of the Act's requirements. 51 The Committee's
findings substantiated the anecdotal evidence of continued
discrimination against indigent patients by hospital emergency
rooms. 52 In response to these findings, the Committee encouraged

HHS to immediately publish regulations implementing EMTALA
nationwide. 53
the transfer of an individual with an emergency medical condition that has not been
stabilized or against any hospital employee because the employee reports a violation of a
requirement of this section.
Id.
49. H.R. Rep. No. 100-531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988). The Committee stated that the
most common form of patient dumping involves the transfer of patients from one hospital
emergency room to another for economic reasons, while other forms "involve discrimination on
the basis of poverty, race, ethnicity, or appearance." Id. at 2-3.
50. Id. at 8. Although the Act became effective on August 1, 1986, the "proposed rules for
the implementation and enforcement of this critical legislation [had] not been published by
[March, 1988]." Id.
51. Id. at 11. "During the 18 months between the amendment's effective date... and
January 31, 1988, only 129 allegations of COBRA violations were filed. When compared with
the 250,000 patients transferred annually for economic reasons ... it appears that the public
has little knowledge of the law and that it is not being enforced." Id. (citations omitted).
52. For example:
A 1984 study at Highland Hospital in Oakland, CA, found that of 458 patients
transferred to the emergency department from other hospitals, 63 percent had no
insurance, 21 percent had Medicaid, 13 percent had Medicare, and only 3 percent had
private insurance. This same study found that a disproportionately large number of
these patients were minority.
Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
53. The Committee stated that the Act itself or the regulations implementing EMTALA
should: (1) prohibit all transfers except those required for adequate medical care; (2) require all
patient transfers to comply strictly with the Act's stipulations; (3) prohibit patient transfers
unless written, informed consent is obtained from the patient or the patient's representative; (4)
require hospitals to maintain a detailed record of each transfer from and to the hospital; (5)
require tertiary care hospitals to accept all patients transferred from smaller hospitals that are
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Following this report, HHS did not publish regulations
implementing EMTALA until June, 1994.4 These regulations merely
parallel the Act's requirements because the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Acts of 1989 and 1990 implemented most of the
Government Operations Committee's recommendations in the interim.55 The only noticeable addition made by the regulations is a
definition clarifying when an individual "comes to the emergency
department" under section 1395dd(a). 6
In sum, the regulations issued by HHS do little more than
implement EMTALA's current statutory language.
Yet, it is
important to realize, these regulations explicitly recognized the
antidumping intent behind EMTALA's enactment. 57 Thus, at every
legislative step in its enactment and implementation, EMTALA's
intent has remained consistent: to correct the practice of dumping
indigent and uninsured patients from hospital emergency rooms.
Notwithstanding this consistent legislative intent, the interpretation
of EMTALA by the federal courts has resulted in confusion,
inconsistency, and a circuit split over the interpretation of the Act.

unequipped to treat emergency patients; (6) require HCFA to establish a system for periodic,
random reviews of hospital transfer files; and (7) award attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs in
civil suits. Id. at 21-22.
54. Medicare Program; Participation in CHAMPUS and CHAMPVA, Hospital Admissions
for Veterans, Discharge Rights Notice, and Hospital Responsibility for Emergency Care, 59 Fed.
Reg. 32086, 32120 ff. (1994) (amending 42 CFR § 405, 489, 1003).
55. Id. at 32090-91 (summarizing the amendments implemented by the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-239, Title VI, §§ 6003(g)(3)(D)(xiv), 6018, 6211, 103 Stat.
2154, 2245 (1989), and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, Title
IV, §§ 4008(b), 4027(a), 4027(k)(3), 104 Stat. 1388-44, 1388-117, 1388-124 (1990)). With respect
to enforcement, the regulations follow the Act explicitly and do not allow successful plaintiffs to
recover attorney's fees in civil suits, as recommended by the Committee in its report.
56. Id. at 32121. Under this section, the regulations define "comes to the emergency
department" to mean "that the individual is on the hospital property (property includes
ambulances owned and operated by the hospital, even if the ambulance is not on hospital
grounds)." Id. at 32121 (amending 42 CFR § 489.24). See Madison v. Jefferson ParishHospital
Service DistrictNo. 1, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9420, at *5 (E.D. La.) (applying this regulation and
finding an emergency patient was covered by EMTALA even though he was only transported in
an ambulance). In addition, the definition of "emergency medical condition" under § 1395dd(eX1)
was expanded to include "psychiatric disturbances and/or symptoms of substance abuse." Id.
This reflects Edward Ramage's suggestion to expand EMTALA's coverage for mentally ill
patients who are dangerous. See Ramage, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at 962 (cited in note 20).
57. Id. at 32088. The regulations conclude, however, that since Congress chose not to
limit EMTALA's protections to Medicare patients, the provisions of the Act extend to all
persons. Id. at 32098.
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III. THE FEDERAL ADJUDICATION OF EMTALA

Following EMTALA's enactment, its federal adjudication has
produced contradictory interpretations and a split among the circuits.
The confusion in the federal courts arises from the inconsistency
between the Act's antidumping legislative purpose and its broad
statutory language that protects "any individual" from improper
emergency medical treatment. The first district courts to hear
EMTALA cases narrowly interpreted the Act according to its
legislative intent. These courts applied EMTALA only to situations
involving patient dumping due to an improper economic motive.
Other district courts then began broadly applying the Act's language,
allowing "any individual" who allegedly received improper emergency
care to sue under the Act.
The federal circuits that have decided the issue have adopted
the broad interpretation of the Act and have concluded that
EMTALA's language applies to any emergency patient, regardless of
ability to pay. While the circuits have agreed on the broader
interpretation of EMTALA's language, the circuits disagree over
whether the hospital's motive is relevant to the cause of action. One
circuit has found that a cause of action is proper only if the hospital
violated the Act's requirements due to an improper motive. Rejecting
this interpretation, five circuits have held, either implicitly or
explicitly, that the hospital's motive is irrelevant to the cause of
action.
The remaining six circuits have not issued opinions
interpreting EMTALA. Thus, while Congress enacted EMTALA to
redress instances of economic discrimination against indigent
patients, only one federal circuit has retained the Act's
antidiscriminatory purpose. The other circuits have broadly contrued
EMTALA's language and have allowed paying patients to challenge
their emergency treatment in federal court, thereby creating a federal
standard for emergency care.
A. EMTALA in the FederalDistrict Courts
The first district courts to decide the EMTALA cases relied
heavily upon the Act's legislative history. The first federal case
involving an alleged violation of EMTALA was Bryant v. Riddle
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Memorial Hospital.58 The sole issue in the case was whether
EMTALA provides for a private cause of action in federal court. 59 As a
case of first impression, the court consulted the legislative history of
the Act and found that Congress intended plaintiffs to bring actions
arising under EMTALA in federal court.6 0 The court then concluded
that its ruling was consistent with the Act's overall purpose of establishing a series of federal guidelines to prevent patient dumping in
Medicare hospitals with emergency facilities.61
Nichols v. Estabrook62 was the first case in which a federal
district court found that EMTALA applied exclusively to cases of
patient dumping.63 This case involved the death of a sixteen-week-old
infant.64 The infant's parents brought him to a hospital emergency
65
room where Dr. Estabrook examined him for vomiting and diarrhea.
After determining the child was suffering from dehydration and a
virus, Dr. Estabrook advised the parents to take their child to see a
pediatrician at another hospital.66 The infant died forty-five minutes
after arrival at the other hospital.6 7 Consequently, the parents sued

58. 689 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Pa. 1988). The plaintiff was an eighty-one year old nursing
home patient who was taken to the hospital for a separated shoulder. Riddle Memorial Hospital
treated her and sent her back to her nursing home within 24 hours. She subsequently sued
Riddle Memorial under EMTALA, claiming that she had been discharged before her condition
was stabilized. Id. at 491.
59. Id. at 491. The court found that the Act allows for civil enforcement through a private
cause of action with a two year statute of limitations; yet the court concluded that the Act did
not explicitly express what forum would be appropriate for the case. Id.
60. Id. The court stated that EMTAIA was enacted to combat the growing problem of
patient dumping, citing the statements of Senator Durenberger and Representative Bilirakis as
well as the Ways and Means Committee Report in support. Id. at 491-92. See notes 15-17 and
accompanying text.
61. Id. at 493.
62. 741 F. Supp. 325 (D. N.H. 1989).
63. Id. at 330. However, at least one case decided prior to Nichols involved a clear case of
patient dumping. Thompson v. St. Anne's Hospital, 716 F. Supp. 8 (N.D. Ill. 1989), involved an
indigent woman who sued two hospitals in connection with the premature delivery of her baby.
When the plaintiff arrived at St. Anne's Hospital experiencing premature labor pains, St. Anne's
personnel examined her and then transferred her to Cook County Hospital, where she delivered
her baby unattended and in unsterilized conditions. Id. at 9. Cook County Hospital moved to
dismiss this claim based upon the fact that it did not transfer or discharge the plaintiff. The
court denied this motion and held that the legislative history of the Act indicates that the
statute prohibits hospitals not only from transferring indigent patients, but also from simply
rejecting them. Id. at 10.
64. Nichols, 741 F. Supp. at 326.
65. Id. A blood sample was taken from the infant, and Dr. Estabrook told the parents that
their baby "was going to be okay" after finding nothing abnormal from the lab results. Id.
66. Id. When the parents requested an ambulance, Dr. Estabrook told them that their
baby's condition was not an emergency and did not require an ambulance. Id.
67. Id. Upon arrival, a pediatric nurse immediately picked up the infant, slapped him,
and called a code. The pediatrician to whom Dr. Estabrook had referred the parents testified
that Dr. Estabrook should have known that the results of the blood sample were bad. Id.
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Dr. Estabrook under EMTALA.68 The court granted Dr. Estabrook's
motion to dismiss because the plaintiffs did not allege that their son
was denied emergency treatment due to their financial condition or
lack of insurance. 9 Based upon EMTALA's legislative history, the
court concluded that the Act only assured patients with emergency
conditions that they would be examined and treated regardless of
70
their financial resources.

Similarly, Evitt v. University Heights Hospital71 refused to
extend EMTALA beyond its legislative purpose. 72 The plaintiff arrived at University Heights Hospital complaining of chest pain. The
attending physician determined that the plaintiff had an inflamed
chest wall and released her less than an hour later with instructions
to return if her condition worsened. 73 Later the same day, the plaintiff returned to the hospital after suffering a heart attack, and she
was transferred to another hospital for further treatment. 74 The
plaintiff sued University Heights for allegedly violating all three
requirements of EMTALA. 75

After observing that EMTALA was

enacted to combat patient dumping 76 the court found that the
plaintiffs interpretation surpassed the Act's purpose of preventing
hospitals from turning away patients for economic reasons. 77 The

68. Id. at 329. The opinion does not specify which of the Act's requirements Dr. Estabrook
allegedly violated. The plaintiffs also brought medical malpractice claims for emotional distress,
lost services, and hedonic damages. Id. at 327-29. Surprisingly, the court did not address the
fact that a plaintiff cannot bring a private action against a physician under EMTALA.
69. Id. at 330. Additionally, the court stated that Dr. Estabrook's alleged conduct did not
invade the interest that Congress sought to protect under EMTALA. Id.
70. Id.
The court cited the Ways and Means Committee Report and Senator
Durenberger's remarks in its opinion. See notes 15 and 17.
71.
727 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
72. Id. at 497.
73.
Id. at 496. She arrived at 2:30 a.m., and at 3:05 a.m. the attending physician advised
her to return home, stop taking Zydone, take Dolobid as directed, and call her private physician
in the morning. She was officially diagnosed with costocondritis (inflammation of the chest
wall), a "nonurgent" condition, and she was reportedly in satisfactory condition upon release.
Id.
74. Id. The plaintiff arrived at 1:50 p.m., in critical condition. After determining that a
myocardial infarction (heart attack) had taken place, the attending doctors at University
Heights transferred the plaintiff to another facility for cardiocatheterization and angioplasty.
Id.
75. Id. The plaintiff claimed that the hospital failed to provide an adequate medical
screening during her first visit because the hospital did not perform a 12-lead EKG test. Id. at
497. In the alternative, she claimed that the hospital did not stabilize her condition or properly
transfer her to another facility during her first visit. Id. at 496.
76. Id. at 497 (citing Bryant, 689 F. Supp. at 491).
77. Id. (citing Reid v. Indianapolis OsteopathicMedical Hospital, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 853,
853 (S.D. Ind. 1989)).
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court determined that the plaintiffs claim was directed toward the
physician's misdiagnosis during her first visit and concluded that her
claims fell under state medical malpractice law. 78 Because EMTALA

was not designed to prevent misdiagnosis, the court stated that
allowing the plaintiffs claim to proceed would force the hospital to
guarantee the physician's diagnosis and treatment. 79 Had the court
sustained the claim, the Act would have applied, regardless of how
reasonable the diagnosis may have been when the patient was
released, and irrespective of whether the physician dumped the
patient or simply found no reason to hospitalize the patient. The
court therefore entered summary judgment against the plaintiff
because she could not prove the hospital turned her away for economic reasons. 80
Stewart v. Myrick5 l is the last case in which a federal court
82
strictly construed EMTALA according to its anti-dumping purpose.
The plaintiffs husband, George Stewart, went to the emergency room
at Hadley Medical Center allegedly complaining of severe chest pain,
loss of color, and shortness of breath. 83 The attending physician instructed Stewart to return to the hospital the next day for gastroin-

78.

Id. at 497. The court further concluded that EMTALA was not intended to preempt

state medical malpractice law. Id. (citing California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101
(1989) for the proposition that there is a presumption against federal preemption of areas
traditionally regulated by the states). Since EMTALA only provides for preemption of state
laws that directly conflict with the Act's requirements, the court found that EMTALA did not
preempt the state's medical malpractice law. Id. Instead, the court stated that the Act merely
adds specifically tailored hospital requirements to prevent patient dumping. Id.
79. Id. at 497-98. It is precisely this level of judicial restraint that should govern
EMTALA, yet the courts have strayed far from this advice.
80. Id. at 498. This analysis therefore used EMTALA's legislative history and its
preemption clause to support its narrow reading. See Stricker, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 1138
(cited in note 14) (observing the weak legal support provided by EMTALA's legislative history in
combination with its preemptive effect).
81. 731 F. Supp. 433 (D. Kan. 1990).
82. At least one commentator has argued that a more recent case follows the narrow
construction of EMTALA. See Stricker, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 1135 (cited in note 14)
(contending that Coleman v. McCurtainMemorialMedical Management,Inc., 771 F. Supp. 343
(E.D. Okla. 1991), allowed an EMTALA action only when an improper economic motive exists).
Stricker's characterization of the Coleman decision is inaccurate. While the Coleman court cited
both Evitt and Stewart as controlling precedent, the opinion granted the defendant hospital's
motion for summary judgment after finding that the plaintiffs claim was for "misdiagnosis."
Coleman, 771 F. Supp. at 347. The court therefore never addressed the issue of patient
dumping.
83. Stewart, 731 F. Supp. at 434. The parties to the case disagreed over Stewart's
symptoms. The attending physician, Dr. Myrick, claimed that Stewart did not describe these
symptoms to either Myrick or his nurse. Nevertheless, the plaintiff claimed that her husband
was under a medical emergency on December 2, the day Stewart first visited the emergency
room.
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testinal tests.84 Following these tests, Stewart did not return to the
hospital until eight days later after suffering extreme chest pain.
Stewart died shortly after his arrival at the emergency room, and his
wife sued the hospital for violating both the medical screening and
stabilization requirements of EMTALA. s5 Relying heavily upon the
Act's legislative history,86 the court dismissed the plaintiffs claim
because it did not involve a case of patient dumping.87 Since the
plaintiff was not turned away for economic reasons, the court concluded that the plaintiffs action did "not present the type of evil that
Congress sought to eliminate in the Act."88
The first federal district court to apply the plain language of the
Act was Deberry v. Sherman Hospital Association.89 In Deberry, the
plaintiff took her daughter to Sherman Hospital's emergency room with a
fever, rash, stiff neck, and symptoms including lethargy and irritability.90
The hospital treated and released the patient. Two days later, the
patient was readmitted by Sherman and diagnosed with spinal
meningitis. The patient lost her hearing as a result of the disease, 91 and

84.

Id. Apparently, these tests were postponed until December 4, but Dr. Myrick was

unable to obtain conclusive results because Stewart had eaten prior to the tests. The plaintiff
also contended that Stewart was experiencing a medical emergency on December 4. Id.
85. Id. at 434. It was uncontroverted at trial that Stewart was never denied treatment
because he was uninsured. Id.
86. The court used the remarks of Representative Bilirakis and Senator Durenberger as
well as the Ways and Means Committee Report to support its interpretation. Id. at 435. For
the content of these remarks, see notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
87. Id. at 436. The court also found that the case represented a traditional claim of
medical malpractice. Id.
88. Id. The court supported its decision with the precedent established in Evitt, even
though neither party had cited the case in its brief. Id.
89. 741 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (N.D. Ill.
1990). Several subsequent federal district cases
have applied the plain language of the statute, holding that a patient's indigence or lack of
insurance is irrelevant to an EMTALA claim. See, for example, Lee v. Alleghany Regional
HospitalCorporation,778 F. Supp. 900, 902 (W.D. Va. 1991) (holding that a plaintiff may state a
claim under EMTALA without alleging that the hospital denied care to the patient due to an
inability to pay); Urban v. King, 783 F. Supp. 560, 562 (D. Kan. 1992) (holding that EMTALA
draws no distinctions between persons with or without the means to pay for medical care);
Ballachino v. Anders, 811 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. N.Y. 1993) (holding that a plaintiff need not
allege indigence); Ruiz v. Kepler, 832 F. Supp. 1444, 1446-47 (D. N.M. 1993) (holding that
EMTALA protects patients other than those who are indigent or uninsured); Cooper v.Gulf
Breeze Hospital, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1538, 1544 (N.D. Fla. 1993) (finding that Congress did not
limit recovery under the Act to cases where hospitals discharged people based on financial
considerations). But see Tolton v. American Biodyne, 854 F. Supp. 505, 511 (N.D. Ohio 1993)
(granting a motion for summary judgment because it was uncontroverted that the patient was
never denied treatment due to his inability to pay or lack of insurance).
90. Deberry, 741 F. Supp. at 1303.
91. Id.
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sued Sherman for violating EMTALA. 92 Relying on the Evitt and Stewart
decisions, the hospital moved for dismissal since it had not dumped the
patient.
The court denied this motion and explicitly refused to follow
both Stewart and Evitt.93 Objecting to Evitt's reasoning,94 the Deberry
court criticized the two grounds for Evitt's narrow reading of
EMTALA. First, the court determined that Evitt's use of the Act's
legislative history was improper. Instead, the Deberry court applied
EMTALA's plain language, finding that matters of policy and
legislative intent are only relevant when the statutory language is
ambiguous.9 5 Since the Act protects "any individual" who claims to
have received improper emergency care, the court concluded it was
not "free to change that language through a clandestine use of the
legislative history."96 Second, the court criticized the Evitt decision for
its discussion of preemption. Although the Evitt court determined
that EMTALA should not preempt state malpractice law,97 the
98
Deberry court held that double coverage of a field is not prohibited.
92. Id. The opinion does not specify which requirement the hospital allegedly violated.
Once it is established that the plaintiff came to the emergency room with an emergency medical
condition, the court found that the hospital could have violated EMTALA by either "(1) failing to
detect the nature of the emergency condition through inadequate screening procedures ....
or,
(2)... by failing to stabilize the condition before releasing the plaintiff." Id. The court then
inaccurately established the four requirements of a proper EMTALA complaint: the plaintiff
must allege that the patient "(1) went to the defendant's emergency room, (2) with an
emergency medical condition, and that the hospital either (3) did not adequately screen [the
patient] to determine whether [the patient] had such a condition, or (4) discharged or
transferred [the patient] before the emergency condition had been stabilized." Id. An accurate
form complaint, following EMTALA's language, should allege: (1) that the patient went to the
defendant's emergency room, (2) with an emergency medical condition, and that the hospital (3)
failed to provide the patient with an appropriate medical screening examination, or (4) failed to
provide the patient with stabilizing treatment after diagnosing the patient's emergency medical
condition, or (5) violated the transfer restrictions after diagnosing the patient's emergency
medical condition but before the condition was stabilized.
93. Id. at 1306.
94. The Deberry court decided that the Evitt opinion was more detailed and concluded that
Stewart employed the same analysis; thus, the court's critique of Evitt applies equally to
Stewart. Id.
95. Id. (citing Unexcelled Chemical Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 59, 64 (1953)). The
court also found that the Act never mentions "either indigence, an inability to pay, or the
hospital's motive as a prerequisite to statutory coverage." Id.
96. Id. at 1307. The court noted that the Evitt court never referred to the text of
EMTALA. Id. at 1306.
97. Id. at 1307 (quoting Evitt, 727 F. Supp. at 497). Evitt concluded that Congress did not
intend EMTALA to preempt state medical malpractice law, which is an area traditionally
governed by the states. Evitt, 727 F. Supp. at 497. Consequently, the Evitt court narrowly
construed the Act. Id.
98. Debermy, 741 F. Supp. at 1307.
The Deberry court concluded that EMTALA's
preemptive power is exactly opposite to the Evitt court's analysis. Deberry found that the Act's
preemption clause, which states that "[the provisions of this section do not preempt any state or
local law requirement, except to the extent that the requirement directly conflicts with a

19951

EMTALA AFTER BABY K

1513

The Deberry opinion established that a broad interpretation of
the Act would not result in the federal preemption of state medical
malpractice law; instead, more conduct would be prohibited by both
federal and state law99 Anticipating disagreement with its broad
interpretation of EMTALA, the Deberry court stated that its role was
not to rewrite legislation inconsistent with its legislative history. 100
Thus, the plaintiffs claim under EMTALA was proper, regardless of
the hospital's motive. 10 1
B. EMTALA in the FederalCircuits
The federal circuit courts that have addressed the issue of
indigence in EMTALA claims have followed the broader interpretation used in Deberry and have extended protection to all emergency
patients who receive improper emergency care. 02 A circuit split has
requirement of this section," shows that Congress intended to provide conflict preemption.
Consequently, the court concl,:ded that conflict preemption does not forbid double regulation; it
only preempts those state laws "where 'compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility.'" Id. (quoting CaliforniaFederalSay. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272, 280 (1987)). The court therefore found that state laws that prohibit the same conduct as
EMTALA are appropriate. Id. See Stricker, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 1146-47 (cited in note 14)
(using Deberry's analysis to show how EMTALA's legislative history and its preemption clause
are weak foundations for an interpretation consistent with the Act's legislative history).
99. Deberty, 741 F. Supp. at 1307. This conclusion implies that states could enact stricter
enforcement mechanisms, such as criminal sanctions against physicians, for violations of
EMTALA's requirements. See Treiger, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1208-09 and n.157 (cited in note 3)
(agreeing with this implication but showing that some believe state criminal sanctions would
frustrate the federal standard imposed by EMTALA).
100. 741 F. Supp. at 1307. The court stated, "it is not this court's place to rewrite the
language enacted by our duly elected officials. If Congress went too far in § 1395dd, then the
statute must either be attacked constitutionally, if that is feasible, or through the same political
processes which caused its enactment. Amendment by the judiciary, however, is never proper."
Id.
101. Id. at 1306. Following this decision, the hospital filed a motion for summary judgment
based upon the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d
266 (6th Cir. 1990). Deberry v. Sherman HospitalAssociation, 769 F. Supp. 1030, 1032 (N.D. Ill.
1991). The hospital claimed that Cleland established that EMTALA does not provide a civil
remedy for mere negligence or misdiagnosis. Id. Consequently, the court found that the
plaintiff failed to produce any evidence upon which a jury could find the hospital liable under
EMTALA. Id. at 1034. Because the hospital conducted an appropriate medical screening
examination and determined that the patient did not have an emergency medical condition, the
court granted the hospital's motion. Id. at 1035. Interestingly, while Cleland held that the
hospital's motive is relevant to an EMTALA claim, the Deberry court declined to follow this
interpretation, holding that a plaintiff does not have to prove that an improper motive underlies
a hospital's denial of care. Id. at 1034.
102. See Brooks, 996 F.2d at 711 n.4 (4th Cir.) ('the language of the Act does not require a
showing that a claimant is uninsured or indigent, nor does it provide that the hospital breaches
the Act's duties only when it acts with economic motives"); Cleland, 917 F.2d at 268 (6th Cir.)
(CWe hold Congress to its words, that this statute applies to any and all patients"); Brooker, 947
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arisen, however, over whether the hospital's motive is relevant to the
case. The Sixth Circuit has taken a more conservative approach that
Five other
emphasizes EMTALA's antidiscriminatory purpose.
circuits have either explicitly or implicitly departed from this
conservative approach, holding that the hospital's motive is irrelevant
to an EMTALA claim. The Seventh Circuit's position on the issue is
unresolved since its only opinion interpreting EMTALA consciously
avoids the issue of indigence in an EMTALA claim. At present six
circuits, including the Seventh Circuit, have not decided the issue of
whether the hospital's improper motive is necessary for a successful
EMTALA claim.
The Sixth Circuit was the first federal circuit to interpret
EMTALA.13 Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc. held that
the Act's plain language applies to any and all emergency patients. 0 4
The Clelands took their fifteen-year-old son to Bronson Methodist
Hospital with complaints of cramping and vomiting. An attending
physician diagnosed the patient with influenza and discharged him.
This diagnosis proved incorrect, and twenty-four hours later the
patient died from a heart attack caused by intussusception. 1°5 The
Clelands sued the hospital under EMTALA, and the district court
F.2d at 415 (9th Cir.) ("We hold that the Act applies to any and all patients, not just to patients

with insufficient resources"); Collins v. DePaul Hospital, 963 F.2d 303, 308 (10th Cir. 1992)
('The fact that Congress ... viewed [EMTALA] as a so-called "anti-dumping" bill.., does not
subtract from its use of the broad term "any individual"); Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1040 (D.C. Cir.)
('Though the... Act's legislative history reflects an unmistakable concern with the treatment of
uninsured patients, the Act itself draws no distinction between persons with and without
insurance"). Interestingly, most federal circuit opinions on this issue continue to quote
EMTALA's legislative history.
103. The first Sixth Circuit case was Thornton v. Southwest DetroitHospital, 895 F.2d 1131
(6th Cir. 1990). Interestingly, this opinion contains several statements that suggest the court

was employing a narrow interpretation of the Act. Elease Thornton suffered a stroke and was
admitted to the emergency room of Southwest Detroit Hospital. She spent ten days in intensive

care and eleven days in regular inpatient care before she was discharged. Id. at 1132. She
subsequently sued the hospital under EMTALA for failing to stabilize her before her release. In
response to this action, the court stated that EMTALA "requires hospitals to give emergency aid
to indigent patients who suffer from an 'emergency medical condition' or 'active labor.'" Id. at
1132. The court then focused on the Act's language under the stabilization requirements of
§ 1395dd(b), which applies to "any individual [who] comes to a hospital" rather than a "hospital
emergency department," as required under the screening requirements of § 1395dd(a).
Consequently, the court held that "once a patient is found to suffer from an emergency medical
condition in the emergency room, she cannot be discharged until the condition is stabilized,
regardless of whether the patient stays in the emergency room." Id. at 1134. Despite this
holding, the court upheld the district court's summary judgment since the patient's condition
was stabilized before her release. In a concurrence, Judge Nathaniel Jones emphasized that
EMTALA was designed to prevent hospitals from dumping indigent patients, stating, "[ilt was
not a measure to force hospitals to provide long-term care for uninsured patients." Id. at 1135.
104. 917 F.2d at 268.
105. Id. Intussusception is a condition that causes a portion of intestine to telescope within
itself. Id.
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dismissed their claim based upon its interpretation that the Act
applied only to indigent or uninsured patients.06 The Sixth Circuit
disagreed with the district court's interpretation and instead held
that the plain language of the statute contains no such limitation.07
Although the court noted that nothing in the legislative history shows
that Congress intended EMTAIA to address anyone other than
uninsured or indigent patients, the Cleland court concluded, "there is
no principle of construction that Congress may not similarly write a
statute that is far broader" than its concern.108 Because the text of a
law controls its legislative history, the Cleland court followed
Deberry's analysis and applied the language Congress enacted.109
Although the Cleland court found that congressional intent is
irrelevant to a plaintiffs eligibility under EMTALA, the court used
the antidiscriminatory purpose of the Act to assist its interpretation
of EMTALA's ambiguous statutory requirements.110 The court first
interpreted the "appropriate medical screening examination" requirements under § 1395dd(a). Respecting the Act's intentions, the
court concluded that a hospital's screening would be appropriate if it
provided the patient with a screening similar to the one it would
provide any other patient."'
The court therefore interpreted
"appropriate" to refer to the hospital's motive.112 Since the record did

106. Id.
107. Id. at 269.
108. Id. (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)). The
court went further and found that the legislative history is only relevant when a statute
contains ambiguous phrases. Because EMTALA applies to "any individual," the court concluded
that the Act's antidumping intent was irrelevant to this unambiguous language. Id.
109. 917 F.2d at 270. Recognizing that this broad interpretation "leads to a result broader
than one might think Congress should have intended, or perhaps than any or all members of
Congress were cognizant of," the court reasoned, "it is not our place to rewrite statutes to
conform with our notions of efficacy or rationality. That is the job of Congress." Id. By
following the analysis of the Deberry court, the Cleland majority explicitly rejected the narrow
interpretation applied in Evitt and Stewart. Id. With respect to its own statements narrowly
construing EMTALA in Thornton, the Sixth Circuit interestingly stated that it had never faced
the issue directly because Thornton did not involve a case in which the district court had
excluded the claim due to a lack of indigene. Id.
110. Id. at 271. The court found the terms "appropriate," under the screening requirements
of § 1395dd(a), and "stabilize," under the stabilization requirements of § 1395dd(b)(1)(A), to be
ambiguous. Thus the court stated, "[i]n attempting to interpret [these] ambiguous phrases, we
can look to legislative history." Id.
111. Id. The court concluded that "'[a]ppropriate' is one of the most wonderful weasel
words in the dictionary, and a great aid to the resolution of disputed issues in the drafting of
legislation. Who, after all, can be found to stand up for 'inappropriate' treatment or actions of
any sort?" Id.
112. Id. at 272. The court determined that a hospital's screening exam is "appropriate" if it
acts in the same manner as it would have for the usual paying patient. Id.
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not indicate that the patient was treated differently than a patient of
another "sex, race, national origin, financial condition, politics, social
status, etc.," the court found the plaintifffs claim improper."1
Consequently, the Cleland decision preserves the Act's antidiscriminatory purpose by focusing on the hospital's motive to
determine whether its medical screening exam complies with
EMTALA.114
Using similar reasoning, the Cleland court interpreted
EMTALA's stabilization requirements to prohibit discriminatory
treatment. In light of the Act's legislative history, the court concluded
that Congress never intended EMTALA to provide a guarantee for
emergency room treatment. 115 The court therefore found that the
hospital satisfied EMTALA's stabilization requirements by treating

113. Id. at 271. The court held that "the complaint simply fails to allege any
inappropriateness in the medical screening in the sense required by the Act." Id. Although the
court refers to EMTAIA's legislative history, this interpretation extends the Act's purpose
beyond patient dumping by inserting additional antidiscriminatory factors unintended by
Congress. The court anticipated its critics, stating:
[T]his result does not constitute a backdoor means of limiting coverage to the indigent or
uninsured. A hospital that provides a substandard (by its standards) or nonexistent
medical screening for any reason (including without limitation, race, sex, politics,
occupation, education, personal prejudice, drunkenness, spite, etc.) may be liable under
this section ....
We can think of many reasons other than indigence that might lead a
hospital to give less than standard attention to a person who arrives at the emergency
room. These might include: prejudice against the race, sex, or ethnic group of the
patient; distaste for the patient's condition (e.g., AIDS patients); personal dislike or
antagonism between the medical personnel and the patient; disapproval of the patient's
occupation; or political or cultural opposition. If a hospital refused treatment to persons
for any of these reasons, or gave cursory treatment, the evil inflicted would be quite akin
to that discussed by Congress in the legislative history, and the patient would fall
squarely within the statutory language.
Id. at 272. But see 59 Fed. Reg. at 32104 (stating the Secretary of HHS's belief that there is no
"impermissible motive" requirement in an action brought under EMTALA's transfer
requirements).
114. Hines v. Adair County Hospital District Corp., 827 F. Supp. 426, 432 (W.D. Ky. 1993)
clarified Cleland's interpretation, holding that a discriminatory motive is an essential element
of an EMTALA claim. The Hines court then described the implications ofCleland's holding
Clearly, a hospital would violate the Act if it declined treatment on the basis of a
patient's inability to pay. At the other end of the continuum, a hospital may violate the
Act if it declined treatment on a completely arbitrary basis, for example, the one
hundredth patient to seek emergency treatment in one day or the patient that arrives
shortly before the end of an emergency room physician's shift.
Id. at 432. The Hines court observed that Cleland's improper motive requirement implicates
federal rights in situations unregulated by state common law, since prior to the enactment of
EMTALA many hospitals had no duty to treat emergency patients. Consequently, the court
agreed with Cleland's improper motive requirement because it preempts the common law of no
duty to treat while stopping short of creating a federal medical malpractice law. Id.
115. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 271.
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the patient in the same way it would have treated a patient with
similar symptoms who had different characteristics.116
Despite its attempt to interpret the Act according to
congressional intent, the Sixth Circuit's anti-discriminatory
interpretation of EMTALA's screening and stabilization requirements
has created a circuit split. In Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare
Corporation"7 the District of Columbia Circuit explicitly departed
from Cleland's improper motive requirement in EMTALA cases.
Gatewood involved factual circumstances similar to those faced by the
Sixth Circuit in Cleland. The plaintiffs husband died from a heart
attack the day after he was discharged from Washington Hospital
Center, where he was diagnosed with musculoskeletal pain." 8 The
plaintiff sued the hospital under EMTALA, and the district court
dismissed the case, after concluding that EMTALA does not provide a
cause of action for fully insured patients who are misdiagnosed by
emergency medical staff." 9 The District of Columbia Circuit applied

the Act's plain language and found that a patient's insurance status is
irrelevant to an EMTALA claim. 20 Because the Act's plain language
protects "any individual" who seeks emergency assistance, the court
concluded that it was bound by the statutory language.121
116. Id. The court concluded, "[in the hospital's opinion, the patient was stable, and they
would have believed that a patient with any differing characteristics would have been stable."
Id. In addition, the court correctly observed that the duty to stabilize only arises after the
hospital determines that an emergency medical condition exists. If the emergency nature of a

patient's condition is not discovered, the court found that a hospital cannot be charged with
failing to stabilize the patient's condition. Id.
117. 933 F.2d 1037, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
118. Id. at 1038. The patient arrived at the emergency room complaining of pain radiating
down his left arm down into his chest. A resident examined the patient and performed blood
tests, an EKG, and a chest X-ray. The attending physician reviewed the test results and
diagnosed the patient as suffering from musculoskeletal pain. The patient was then discharged
with instructions to use a heating pad, take Tylenol, and arrange a follow-up appointment with
his physician. Id. at 1039.
119. Id. at 1038. The district court held that EMTALA was enacted to prevent patient
dumping, and found that fully insured patients who were misdiagnosed had no cause of action
under the Act. Id. at 1039. Consequently, the district court based its dismissal on the fact that
the patient's release was not based upon his insurance status, his inability to pay, or other
economic factors. Id. at 1040.
120. Id. at 1039. Despite EMTALA's anti-dumping legislative intent, the court found that
the Act's language makes no distinction between persons with and without insurance. Id. at
1040. The court qualified this finding by stating that EMTALA does not create a broad federal
cause of action for emergency room malpractice or negligence. In the absence of any allegation
that the hospital departed from its standard emergency room procedures in treating the patient,
the court determined that questions involving the patient's diagnosis remain the exclusive
province of state negligence and malpractice law. Id. at 1039, 1041.
121. Id. at 1040. The court decided that the plain language should govern since EMTALA's
language is not manifestly inconsistent with the legislative intent. Id. (citing United Mine
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After resolving the issue of the plaintiffs eligibility, the court
focused exclusively on the plaintiffs claim that the hospital violated
EMTALA's screening requirements. 21 2
Interpreting the word
"appropriate," the court found the Act "is intended not to ensure each
emergency room patient a correct diagnosis, but rather to ensure that
each is accorded the same level of treatment regularly provided to
patients in similar medical circumstances. '' 123

The court therefore

held that a hospital fulfills the "appropriate medical screening" requirement if it conforms to its standard screening procedures when it
treats an emergency patient.124 The Gatewood court departed from
the Cleland opinion and held that the hospital's motive for the departure from its standard screening procedures is irrelevant to an
EMTALA claim. 125 Since the plaintiff did not allege that the patient
was given differential treatment, the court affirmed the district
court's dismissal.

26

Again, it must be emphasized that Congress enacted EMTALA
to prevent economic discrimination against indigent and uninsured
patients. Although Cleland did not limit the cause of action to instances of economic discrimination, its improper motive requirement
requires plaintiffs to prove the hospital discriminated against them in
some way. Thus, the Sixth Circuit's interpretation preserves the
antidiscriminatory purpose of the Act. The Gatewood analysis
abandons the improper motive requirement, and thus gives any paWorkers of America v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, 671 F.2d 615, 621
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Aviation ConsumerAction Projectv. Washburn, 535 F.2d 101, 106-07 (D.C. Cir.
1976). In response to the hospital's argument that the Act's language contradicts EMTALA's
purpose, the Gatewood court found the Act's language extends beyond its congressional intent,
without undermining or conflicting with the Act's legislative history. 933 F.2d at 1041 n.2. The
Gatewood court also believed that its application of EMTALA's plain language was consistent
with the Cleland court's decision. Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1040-41.
122. 933 F.2d at 1041. The Gatewood court declined to address the scope of the Act's
stabilization and transfer requirements because those provisions are contingent on the
hospital's discovery of an emergency medical condition. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. Any departure from the hospital's standard screening procedures consequently
constitutes an inappropriate screening in violation of EMTALA. Id.
125. Id. The court found that EMTALA applies "whenever and for whatever reason a
patient is denied the same level of care provided [to] others." Id. The court explicitly recognized
its departure from the Sixth Circuit's interpretation in Cleland, stating, "we do not read
subsection 1395dd(a) as referring in any way to the 'motives' with which an emergency room
acts when it provides something less than its normal screening procedure." Id. at 1041 n.3.
Recognizing that some hospital screening procedures may fall below the standard of care
established by state negligence and malpractice law, the court refused to incorporate a
negligence standard into EMTALA. Id. at 1041. The court concluded that EMTALA creates a
new federal cause of action for failure to treat, which is generally unavailable under state law,
instead of duplicating preexisting legal protections. Id.
126. Id. at 1041-42.
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tient willing to claim differential treatment the ability to sue under
EMTALA. Consequently, paying patients can capitalize on the D.C.
Circuit's broad interpretation and transform EMTALA into a federal
mandate for emergency room care. This result is unfortunate because
indigent and uninsured patients are no longer the primary
beneficiaries of the Act's protections.
Therefore, the federal circuits are split between the improper
motive requirement established in Cleland and the strict liability
standard established in Gatewood. One federal circuit has explicitly
followed the Gatewood court's interpretation of EMTALA, while three
circuits have implicitly applied its analysis. Refusing to follow
Cleland, the Fourth Circuit expressly sided with Gatewood in Power
v. Arlington Hospital Association,127 holding that an improper motive
is not an element necessary for an EMTALA claim. The Fourth
Circuit believed it would be virtually impossible for a plaintiff to
prevail in a civil EMTALA claim if the plaintiff had to prove the
hospital violated the Act's screening requirements due to an improper
motive.128 The Eighth, Tenth, and E]eventh Circuits have implicitly
followed Gatewood by holding that EMTALA merely requires
hospitals to provide uniform screening procedures for all emergency
patients.129 While the Ninth Circuit has held that the Act applies to
all emergency patients regardless of their ability to pay, 130 it has not
decided between Cleland or Gatewood on the issue of whether the
hospital's motive is relevant to an EMTALA claim.

127. 42 F.3d 851, 857-58 (4th Cir. 1994).
128. Id.
129. Williams v. Birkeness, 34 F.3d 695, 697 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Gatewood, 933 F.2d at
1041, and upholding summary judgment in favor of the hospital because the plaintiffs failed to
show that the hospital treated the patient differently from other patients); Repp v. Anadarko
Municipal Hospital, 43 F.3d 519, 522 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041, and
holding that a hospital violates EMTALA's screening requirements when it does not follow its
own standard screening procedures); Holcomb v. Monahan, 30 F.3d 116, 117 (11th Cir. 1994)
(citing Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041, and holding that a hospital does not violate EMTALA as
long as it applies the same screening procedures to indigent patients that it applies to paying
patients). Although the federal circuits understand the reason for the split, they are confused
over where the split exists. For example, the Tenth Circuit thinks the Eighth Circuit has sided
with Cleland. Compare Repp, 1994 WL 703458 at 3 n.7 (stating that the Eighth Circuit in
Williams departed from Gatewood and followed Cleland because it held that a plaintiff must
show the hospital treated the patient differently from other patients), with Williams, 34 F.3d at
697 (citing Gatewood in support of its holding). The Eleventh Circuit is straddling the fence
somewhat, although its holding seems to follow Gatewood's requirement for uniform screening.
See Holcomb, 30 F.3d at 117 (citing both Cleland and Gatewood in support of its holding).
130. Brooker v. Desert Hospital Corp., 947 F.2d 412, 414-15 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Consequently, six federal circuits have not decided whether
EMTALA requires an improper motive. Of those six, five have not
issued opinions on whether EMTALA protects patients who are not
indigent or uninsured. 131 Although the Seventh Circuit found that
EMTALA's protections are not limited to indigent or uninsured patients in Johnson v. University of Chicago Hospitals,132 the court
withdrew its opinion sua sponte.133 The Seventh Circuit then issued
another opinion in Johnson a month later, which curiously avoids the
issue of indigence in an EMTALA claim."3 In fact, the Seventh
Circuit seems to have retreated from the issue, stating only that
EMTALA was enacted to address patient dumping and that hospitals
must accept any patient seeking treatment in their emergency
rooms. 135

Consequently, the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of

EMTALA is still uncertain, and this recent retraction might indicate a
more conservative alignment with the Sixth Circuit's Cleland standard. The First, Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits have not addressed
the issues of indigence or improper motive.
Although all the federal circuits to decide an EMTALA case
have broadly applied the Act's language to include all emergency
patients, the five remaining circuits could take a more conservative
approach and limit EMTALA's application exclusively to cases
involving patient dumping. While this narrow interpretation would
make EMTALA's protections consistent with the Act's legislative
history, the Act's broad language presents a formidable obstacle to
such a narrow application. If, instead, these remaining circuits follow
the Sixth Circuit's interpretation in Cleland, they could at least
preserve EMTALA's anti-discriminatory purpose by requiring
plaintiffs to prove the hospital violated the Act due to an improper
motive. Following Cleland's improper motive requirement would
solidify the current circuit split, and thus pressure Congress to clarify
its intent by amending EMTALA.
131. The Ninth Circuit in Brooker, id. at 414, stated that the Act's language does not
specify any economic criteria that limits the type of individuals protected by EMTALA.
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit has not decided whether a plaintiff must prove the hospital used
an improper motive in an EMTALA claim. Thus the Ninth Circuit has not decided its position
on the circuit split.
132. 1992 WL 259404, 4 (7th Cir.) (citing Brooker, Gatewood, and Cleland to support its
finding that the Act's language does not differentiate potential plaintiffs according to their
economic status).
133. Id. at 5. In this opinion, the Johnson majority found that an allegation that the
patient was denied care because of an inability to pay is not necessary under EMTALA. Id. at 4.
134. Johnson v. University of Chicago Hospitals,982 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1992).
135. Note that this conclusion was relegated to a footnote in the second opinion. See id. at
233 n.7.
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The Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Baby K illustrates the
profound ramifications of expanding the Act beyond its legislative
intent. By broadly applying the Act's protections in Baby K, the
Fourth Circuit used EMTALA to determine the sensitive ethical and
clinical decisions surrounding the treatment of a terminally ill infant.
This holding was the inevitable result of the broad interpretation
established in Gatewood. Creating strict liability for disparate treatment under EMTALA, without regard to improper economic motive,
made it inevitable that EMTALA would be used to challenge a hospital's medical judgments. Rather than merely redressing the economic
discrimination against indigent patients, EMTALA can now be used
to control the disparate treatment of terminally ill patients.
Recognizing the far-reaching ramifications of Baby K, the five remaining circuits should preserve EMTALA's antidiscriminatory intent by
siding with the Sixth Circuit and refusing to follow the precedent
established by the Fourth Circuit in Baby K.
IV. IN THE MATTER OFBABYK AND THE FOURTH CIRcuIT's EXTENSION

OF EMTALA
Baby K had anencephaly, an incurable congenital defect that

left the child without a major portion of the brain, skull, and scalp. 136

Consequently, she was permanently unconscious, with only her brain
stem to support her organs and reflexes. 137 Like most anencephalic
infants, Baby K had breathing difficulties when she was born. 138 The
hospital placed Baby K on a mechanical ventilator and explained the
child's condition to her mother, Ms. H.139 The hospital recommended
that Baby K be provided with only comfort care in the form of nutrition, hydration, and warmth. Given Baby K's condition, the hospital
felt ventilator treatment was medically inappropriate and urged Ms.
H to permit a "Do Not Resuscitate Order," which would withhold any
lifesaving measures in the future.140 Ms. H refused and insisted the
hospital provide Baby K with mechanical ventilation whenever she
136. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592. Although Baby K had a normal heart rate, blood pressure,
liver function, digestion, kidney function, and bladder function, most anencephalic children die
within days of birth. In the Matter of Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (E.D. Va. 1993).
137. Baby K, 16 F.3d. at 592. Baby K's condition was diagnosed before birth; yet Baby K's
mother, Ms. H, chose to carry the child to term.
138. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1025.
139. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592-93.
140. Id.
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went into respiratory distress. 141 When Baby K's condition stabilized,
142
the hospital transferred her to a nursing home.
After her transfer, Baby K had recurrent respiratory distress.
Each time this occurred, she was readmitted to the hospital where
she received mechanical ventilator treatment. 43 She was then transferred back to the nursing home when her breathing stabilized.144 The
hospital filed for a declaratory judgment to determine whether it
must continue providing Baby K with medical treatment it considered
medically and ethically inappropriate. 145 The district court found that
the hospital was legally obligated to provide mechanical ventilation to
Baby K under EMTALA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the
Americans with Disabilities Act. 146 In addition, the court held that

141. Id. at 593. Following Ms. H's refusal, the treating physicians conferred with the
hospital's ethics committee to override Ms. H's wishes. The ethics committee, composed of a
family practitioner, a psychiatrist, and a minister, met with the treating physicians and
concluded that the hospital should withdraw Baby K's ventilator since this treatment was futile
in the committee's opinion. Ms. H refused to withdraw aggressive treatment. Baby K, 832 F.
Supp. at 1025. Ms. H had a firm Christian faith that all life should be protected, and she
believed God would work a miracle if that was God's will. Otherwise, she believed that God
should decide the moment of Baby K's death, not other human beings. Id. at 1026.
142. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 593. During her stay at the nursing home, Baby K's breathing had
stabilized and thus she no longer needed ventilator assistance. Baby K's transfer to the nursing
home was conditioned upon the fact that the hospital would readmit her if she developed
respiratory distress again. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1025.
143. During one of these visits, Baby K was given a tracheostomy, a procedure in which a
breathing tube is surgically implanted in the windpipe to facilitate ventilator treatment. Id. at
1025-26.
144. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 593.
145. Id. The baby's father, Mr. K, and her guardian ad litem joined the hospital's request.
Id. Ms. H and Mr. K had never married, and Mr. K had only been distantly involved in Baby
K's circumstances. Neither the hospital nor Ms. H sought Mr. Ks opinion or consent in the
treatment decisions surrounding Baby K. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1025.
146. Id. at 1031. Under EMTALA, the court found that Baby K's respiratory distress was
an emergency medical condition within the Act's statutory definition, and that ventilator
treatment was necessary to stabilize this condition. Id. at 1026-27. Because EMTALA does not
include an exception for futile or inhumane treatment, the court observed, "[alny argument to
the contrary should be directed to the U.S. Congress, not the Federal Judiciary." Id. at 1027.
Even assuming that the Act included such an exception, the court stated that the use of
ventilator treatment to assist breathing is not futile or inhumane in relieving the acute
symptoms of respiratory distress. 'To hold otherwise would allow hospitals to deny emergency
treatment to numerous classes of patients, such as accident victims who have terminal cancer or
AIDS, on the grounds that they eventually will die anyway from those diseases and that
emergency care for them would therefore be 'futile.'" Id.
Addressing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the court observed that § 504 prohibits federally
funded entities from discriminating against "otherwise qualified" handicapped individuals,
solely by reason of their handicaps. The court found that anencephaly qualified as a handicap
under the Rehabilitation Act, and thus the hospital could not refuse Baby K ventilator
treatment solely because she had anencephaly. Id. at 1028. "Just as an AIDS patient seeking
ear surgery is 'otherwise qualified' to receive treatment despite poor long term prospects of
living, Baby K is 'otherwise qualified' to receive ventilator treatment despite similarly dismal
health prospects." Id.
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Ms. H had a constitutional right to demand the treatment. 147 The
hospital then appealed the case to the Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision exclusively under EMTALA.148
Although the court determined that
Congress enacted EMTALA to prevent hospitals from dumping
uninsured patients, the court quickly dismissed the Act's legislative
intent by concluding that EMTALA was designed to provide an
"'adequate first response to a medical crisis' for all patients."149 After
dismissing the legislative intent, the court found that EMTALA
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the court found that public accommodations
cannot discriminate against disabled individuals. Since anencephaly is a "physical . . .
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities," the court found
that the "ADA does not permit the denial of ventilator services that would keep alive an
anencephalic baby when those life-saving services would otherwise be provided to a baby
without disabilities." Id. at 1028-29 (citing § 302 of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 12182).
The hospital also sought a declaratory judgment under the Child Abuse Amendments of
1984, 42 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. The court declared that there is no private right of action under
the Child Abuse Amendments because those amendments only authorize states, which receive
federal funds for child abuse programs, to bring legal action through their child protective
services. Id. at 1029. In addition, the court refused to decide Virginia's standard of care for
anencephalic infants. Id.
147. Id. at 1030-31. The district court first found that Ms. H had a constitutionally
protected primary right to raise Baby K grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. Id. at 1030 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). The court further concluded that Ms. H's decisions
affecting Baby K could be based upon the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Id.
(citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234). These constitutional principles
extend to parental rights to make medical treatment decisions for their minor children, even if
these decisions violate a child's liberty interests. Id. (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 60304 (1979)). The court concluded that when parents do not agree over whether their child's life
support should be terminated, it must yield to the presumption in favor of life, supported by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. Since Ms. H's decision was also based upon her
religious free exercise rights under the First Amendment, the court found that the hospital's
reasons to terminate Baby K's ventilator treatments were not clear and compelling enough to
override the constitutional rights of Ms. H and Baby K. Id. at 1030-31.
148. See Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592 n.2 (finding that EMTALA requires the hospital to provide
stabilizing treatment and refusing to address the other federal statutes and the laws of
Virginia).
149. Id. at 593 (quoting Baber, 977 F.2d at 880). It is important to recognize how the court
employed creative citation to support its statement that Congress enacted EMTALA to provide
an adequate first response for all patients. At first glance, the statement seems to be a direct
quotation from the Congressional Record since the Fourth Circuit reiterated its statements from
Baber, which presumably quoted Senator Dole's statements at 131 Cong. Rec. S13904 (Oct. 23,
1985). Yet upon closer inspection, Senator Dole's statements merely say that EMTALA
"provid[es] an adequate first response to a medical crisis." 131 Cong. Rec. S13904 (Oct 23,
1985). In addition, this statement directly follows Senator Dole's remarks urging Congress to
put an end to patient dumping for purely financial reasons. The Fourth Circuit in Baber
supplemented this language with its interpretation that EMTALA applies to all patients, and
the Baby K court erroneously used the Baber court's addition.
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governed Baby K's treatment, without determining whether Baby K's
mother was indigent or uninsured.1 0
The Fourth Circuit then outlined the hospital's responsibilities
under EMTALA. Under section 1395dd(a), the hospital was required
to provide Baby K with an appropriate medical screening examination
to determine whether she had an emergency medical condition. 151
Since Baby K's respiratory distress qualified as an emergency medical
condition, the court concluded that the diagnosis of this condition
triggered the hospital's duty to stabilize the distress with mechanical
ventilation. 152 The hospital first claimed anencephaly, not respiratory
distress, was Baby K's emergency condition, and thus EMTALA only
required the hospital to provide Baby K with the same treatment it
would provide other anencephalic infants." 3 The majority disagreed."5 Concluding that Baby K's emergency condition was respira150. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 593.
151. Id. The court determined that a "hospital fulfills this duty if it utilizes identical
screening procedures for all patients complaining of the same condition or exhibiting the same
symptoms." Id. (citingBaber,977 F.2d at 879 n.6).
152. Id. at 594-95. Transfer was not an option because all area hospitals with pediatric
intensive care units declined to accept a transfer of Baby K. Id. at 594. Stabilization was
interpreted to mean treatment "necessary to 'assure within a reasonable medical probability,
that no material deterioration of Baby K's condition is likely to occur.'" Id. This conclusion
closely mirrors the statutory definition of "to stabilize" in § 1395dd(e)(3)(A), except that the
court did not use the last phrase of the definition which states: "... no material deterioration of
the condition is likely to result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a
facility." Recognizing the fact that stabilization is defined in terms of transfer, the hospital
argued that it did not have to provide Baby K with ventilator treatment because it was not
going to transfer her following the treatment. Id at 597. The court rejected this argument since
it would allow hospitals to avoid EMTALA's stabilization requirement by refusing to transfer
the patient. The court then provided the best explanation of EMTALA's requirements to date:
§ 1395dd(b) requires a hospital to provide stabilizing treatment to any individual who
comes to a participating hospital, is diagnosed [with] an emergency medical condition,
and cannot be transferred in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c). The use of
the word 'transfer' to describe the duty of a hospital to provide stabilizing treatment
evinces a Congressional intent to require stabilization prior to discharge or that
treatment necessary to prevent material deterioration of the patient's condition during
transfer. It was not intended to allow hospitals and physicians to avoid liability under
EMTALA by accepting and screening a patient and then refusing to treat the patient
because the patient cannot or will not be transferred.
Id. at 597-98. The hospital was required to provide Baby K with the ventilator treatment
necessary to stabilize her condition because no other hospital would accept Baby K's transfer, a
restriction under § 1395dd(c). If, however, another area hospital had agreed to accept the
transfer of Baby K, the hospital could have avoided stabilizing Baby K's respiratory distress,
provided the other transfer restrictions under subsection (c) were satisfied.
153. Id. at 595 (citing Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America, 977 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1992) and
Brooks v. Maryland Gen. Hospital, Inc., 996 F.2d 708 (4th Cir. 1993), two Fourth Circuit
decisions that held that the Act requires hospitals to provide uniform screening procedures to
all patients exhibiting the same emergency condition). Anencephalic infants are generally
provided with limited medical care consisting of warmth, nutrition, and hydration. Id. at 596.
154. Id. The court distinguished the case at issue from Baber and Brooks. Those cases
involved screening procedures, and neither addressed a hospital's stabilization responsibilities
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tory distress, not anencephaly, the court decided that the hospital
must provide Baby K with the same treatment given to all patients
experiencing respiratory distress.155 EMTALA therefore required the
hospital to provide Baby K with ventilator treatment to stabilize her
recurrent respiratory distress.
The hospital also argued that Congress did not intend the Act
to require physicians to provide treatment exceeding the medical
standard of care for anencephalic infants.156 In response, the Fourth
Circuit stated that neither the statutory language nor the legislative
history of EMTALA created an exception when the required treatment exceeded the prevailing standard of care. 57 Ignoring the plain
language of the Act would transcend the court's judicial function.
Therefore, the court felt that Congress was the appropriate branch to
redress the hospital's concerns. 158 Consequently, the court held that a
straightforward application of the Act obligated the hospital to
provide Baby K with ventilator treatment whenever she arrived in
respiratory distress.
In a passionate dissent, Senior Circuit Judge Sprouse expressed his doubt that Congress intended EMTALA to control the
sensitive decisions between family and physicians involved in this
case. 159 Judge Sprouse stated that the legislative history of EMTALA
reveals that Congress designed the Act specifically to correct the
dumping of indigent or uninsured emergency patients. 60 Since Baby
once a patient's emergency medical condition has been diagnosed. Criticizing the hospital's
interpretation, the court stated that if the Act merely required a hospital to provide uniform
treatment, it could provide Baby K with substandard treatment as long as that treatment was
consistent with the treatment given to patients with the same condition. Id.
155. Id. at 596.
156. Id.
157. Id. The majority concluded that the plain language of EMTALA requires the hospital
to provide stabilizing treatment to any individual who comes to a Medicare hospital, who is
diagnosed with an emergency condition, and who cannot be transferred. Id.
158. Id. The court stated: 'e recognize the dilemma facing physicians who are requested
to provide treatment they consider morally and ethically inappropriate, but we cannot ignore
the plain language of the statute." Id. In conclusion, the court stated that:
EMTALA does not carve out an exception for anencephalic infants in respiratory
distress any more than it carves out an exception for comatose patients, those with lung
cancer, or those with muscular dystrophy-all of whom may repeatedly seek emergency
stabilizing treatment for respiratory distress and also possess an underlying medical
condition that severely affects their quality of life and ultimately results in their death.
Id. at 598.
159. Id. (Sprouse, J., dissenting). Judge Sprouse observed that "[t]ragic end-of-life hospital
dramas such as this one do not represent phenomena susceptible of uniform legal control." Id.
160. Id. He expressed his doubt that Congress, even in its weakest moments, would have
imposed federal control of the sensitive, private treatment decisions surrounding terminally ill
patients. Id.
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K's circumstances did not involve dumping or disparate treatment,
Judge Sprouse believed this case fell outside the scope of EMTALA's
anti-dumping provisions. 161 In addition, Judge Sprouse agreed with
the hospital's argument that Baby K's emergency medical condition
was anencephaly, and thus he believed that respiratory distress
should be considered as one of many subsidiary conditions of
anencephaly.12 Consequently, he reasoned that the Act was not
designed to control the situation at hand since Baby K's respiratory
distress merely represented a subsidiary symptom of an incurable
63
condition.
The majority opinion and the dissent in Baby K illustrate the
confusion over EMTALA's applicability. Although both the majority
and the dissent consulted the legislative history of the Act, each came
to a different conclusion over whether the Act controlled this case.
The facts of Baby K presented unique difficulties for EMTALA. As
Judge Sprouse's dissent clearly observed, the Act's legislative history
reveals Congress never intended EMTALA to govern the medical and
ethical treatment decisions surrounding terminally ill patients.
Congress enacted EMTALA to prevent patient dumping. Baby K
would have never created such legal confusion had EMTALA been
interpreted to cure only the evils Congress intended to correct. If this
were the case, the Act would only protect indigent and uninsured
patients, not patients with terminal illnesses like anencephaly.
Nevertheless, the majority's decision in Baby K represents the
next logical step in a line of federal cases that has broadly construed
EMTALA's current language beyond its legislative intent. The precedential step established in Baby K may prove to be the Pandora's box
of EMTAI's adjudication, releasing a host of ramifications unimagined by Congress. The outcomes made possible by the Baby K decision should encourage Congress to amend the Act's language and ensure that its requirements simply prevent patient dumping, as originally intended.

161. Id. In fact, Judge Sprouse noted that Baby K was not brought to the hospital with an
emergency medical condition; she was born there. Id.
162. Id. at 599.
163. Id. Given Baby Ks unique medical condition, Judge Sprouse felt her treatment should
be interpreted as a continuum, "not as a series of discrete emergency medical conditions to be
considered in isolation." Id. He stated that other cases such as those involving trauma, cancer,
or other catastrophic illnesses may require different analyses and suggested a case-by-case
analysis. Id.
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V. THE FUTURE RAMIFICATIONS OF BABYK FOR EMTALA
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Baby K illustrates the critical
condition of EMTALA. Following the Baby K precedent, three equally
serious results could threaten the Act's future in the federal courts.
The first involves statutory interpretation. Although EMTALA's
legislative history clearly reveals the Act's antidumping purpose, its
broad statutory language protects a potential class of plaintiffs who
are not indigent and uninsured. Without congressional amendment of
EMTALA's current language, recent opinions by the United States
Supreme Court encourage federal courts to disregard the Act's legislative history. The second ramification created by Baby K relates to
EMTALA's ethical scope. The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the
Act now allows plaintiffs to overcome a hospital's clinical autonomy
with federal law. Lastly, the Baby K decision produces a profound
ramification for other federal laws that govern discriminatory
practices beyond the purview of patient dumping. By using EMTALA
to correct a hospital's discriminatory treatment of an anencephalic
infant, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation effectively preempts laws
such as the Rehabilitation Act,'6 the ADA,165 and the Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984,166 which are better equipped to deal with the

issues surrounding the treatment of terminally ill patients.
A The StatutoryInterpretationof EMTALA
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Baby K exemplifies the split of
opinion between the circuits over EMTALA's statutory interpretation.
Like the D.C. Circuit's decision in Gatewood,167 the Baby K majority
simply applied the plain language of the Act without recognizing the
antidiscriminatory purpose behind EMTALA's codified words. Unlike
68 these
the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of EMTALA in Cleland,1
circuits feel they are required to follow the enacted language. In
other words, if EMTALA's statutory language reaches further than

164. 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

166. 42 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq.
167. 933 F.2d at 1041 n.3
requirement).
168. 917 F.2d at 271.

(explicitly disagreeing with Cleland's improper motive
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congressionally intended, then Congress should amend its sloppy
legislation. 16 9
It is important to note that this strict statutory
construction-and its accompanying disregard for an act's legislative
history-is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's
current position on statutory interpretation. In the past, the Supreme
Court employed a looser standard of statutory construction to allow
federal courts to investigate an act's legislative history and determine
whether the alleged conduct was within the spirit of the law.170 This
older federal standard determined whether the purported actions
matched the evil the statute was designed to remedy.' 7 ' Baby K would
have been a very different decision if this looser standard of statutory
construction were the prevailing method used today.
Yet the Supreme Court construes statutes much more strictly
today. In fact, it seems that Justice Scalia's view of congressional
committee reports as insignificant has rendered legislative history
irrelevant to statutory interpretation. 72 Since the opinions expressed
in committee reports represent only a few members of Congress, the
Supreme Court's recent opinions hold that an act's statutory
language, and not its legislative history, is the "authoritative
expression of the law."'' 7

Given this strict federal standard of

169. See Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596 (stating that "it is not our role to rewrite legislation passed
by Congress").
170. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (finding that
is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the
"[i]t
statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers'.
171. Id. at 463 (advising that an act's purpose is to be found in "contemporaneous events,
the situation as it properly existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative
body'. See also United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201
(1979) (holding that Title VII must be "read against the background of the legislative history...
and the historical context from which the Act arose"). But see id. at 216 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (arguing that this method of statutory construction violates the separation of powers
because "under the guise of statutory 'construction,' the Court effectively rewrites Title VII to
achieve what it regards as a desirable result").
172. Justice Scalia expressed his opinion of committee reports in his concurrence in
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S 597, 617 (1991). In that case, Justice Scalia
stated that committee reports are unreliable, "not only as a genuine indicator of congressional
intent but as a safe predictor of judicial construction." Id. Observing that congressional
committees contain a discrete number of senators or representatives, he illustrated how
insignificant a committee's opinion on an issue is in relation to the whole Congress. Id. at 620.
Thus, "[all we know for sure is that the full Senate adopted the text that we have before us
here, as did the full House,. . . and that that text ...became law.... [I]t would be better still

to stop confusing [the courts], and not to use committee reports at all." Id. at 621.
173. Chicago v. EnvironmentalDefense Fund, 114 S.Ct. 1588, 1593, 128 L.Ed.2d 302 (1994)
(quoting the Court of Appeals' expression: "'why should we, then, rely upon a single word in a
committee report that did not result in legislation? Simply put, we shouldn't"). See also NLRB
v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1778, 1784 (1994) (stating that it is the function of
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statutory interpretation, the Fourth Circuit's application of EMTALA
in Baby K could be correct.
Nevertheless, EMTALA was designed-as an overwhelming
majority of federal courts have recognized-to address patient
dumping. Congress did not design the Act's protection to determine
the sensitive medical and ethical decisions involved in the treatment
of a terminally ill infant. In light of the prevailing method of
statutory construction, which disregards the statutory purpose
contained within legislative history, Congress should remove all
doubts and amend EMTALA to eliminate the inconsistency between
the Act's original intent and its statutory language. Amendment of
the Act represents the only available method to ensure that EMTALA
fulfills its antidumping purpose. 174 Otherwise, the federal courts'
application of the Act to "any individual" will encourage economically
secure individuals to seek EMTAIA's protections, while the indigent
and uninsured patients for whom the Act's protections were designed
will become insignificant parties in an ever-increasing class of
17 5
plaintiffs.
B. The Act's Ethical Scope Following Baby K
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Baby K will cause serious
consequences for EMTALA's future application. As Judge Sprouse's
dissent in Baby K observed, Congress did not enact EMTALA to
govern the ethical decisions between a terminally ill patient's family
and physicians. 176 Yet the Baby K court used EMTALA to force a
hospital to continue giving medical treatment it considered ethically
and medically inappropriate. This precedent could have profound
ethical ramifications in future EMTALA claims. By compelling the
hospital to provide Baby K with recurrent ventilator treatment, the
Fourth Circuit effectively preempted the advice of Baby K's attending
the courts to say what an enacted statute means, not the legislature-much less a committee of
one house of the legislature).
174. The Supreme Court's current position illustrates the necessity for EMTALA's
amendment. The principles of City of Chicago, 114 S. Ct. at 1593, suggest that unless
Congress's antidumping intent is included in the Act's language, it is not in the law. See
Stricker, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 1138 (cited in note 14) (encouraging Congress to amend
EMTALA to eliminate the weak support of an antidumping interpretation provided by the
legislative history).
175. In fact, EMTALA's current language does not allow successful plaintiffs to recover
attorney's fees. Consequently, very few indigent and uninsured patients will take advantage of
the Act's protections.
176. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 598.
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physicians. This precedent will allow future federal courts to replace
a hospital's medical autonomy with EMTALA's stabilization
of the patient's best interests. 177
requirements, regardless
Accordingly, the ethical scope of the Fourth Circuit's decision could be
boundless.
Consequently, Congress should amend EMTALA to protect
only indigent and uninsured patients. This would prevent hospitals
from discriminating against indigent and uninsured patients based
upon their ability to pay for emergency care. In addition, this
amendment would refocus EMTALA's legislative purpose on indigent
patients, allowing other federal laws to govern non-economic types of
discrimination. Under this framework, Baby K would have had a
different outcome. Since Baby K was not the victim of economic discrimination, EMTALA would not have governed the case. Instead,
other federal laws better equipped to determine whether the hospital
was attempting to discriminate against Baby K because of her
disability would have controlled. Had Baby K been indigent, however,
EMTALA would have applied only if her mother felt the bospital was
17 8
denying the child care based on her inability to pay.
Amending EMTALA is the only way to refocus the Act's protections on the indigent and uninsured beneficiaries for whom it was
enacted. Otherwise, a patient's ability to pay will become increasingly irrelevant, and paying patients will be able to use EMTALA as a
federal weapon with which to challenge any clinical decision a hospital makes. Following Baby K, an elderly husband whose wife is in a
persistent vegetative state could presumably use EMTALA to compel
a hospital to keep his wife alive indefinitely, provided she intitially
came to the hospital with an emergency condition179 In fact, the
Fourth Circuit's precedent in Baby K could have arguably allowed Ms.
H to force the hospital to mechanically ventilate her child indefinitely,
even if the child's health deteriorated dramatically. Admittedly,

177. By contrast, a recent case in the United Kingdom held that doctors should not be
ordered to treat severely handicapped infants against the doctor's clinical judgment. This more
sensitive approach considers the best interest of the child rather than a mechanical application
of a law. See Frances H. Miller, Infant Resuscitation, a US/ UK Divide, The Lancet 1584 (June
25, 1994) (discussing Baby K in light of the UK approach and arguing that the infant's ultimate
welfare as a whole human being should determine the judicial course).
178. Under the framework that this Note proposes, the allocation of public resources would
become an issue in cases involving indigent patients with conditions such as anencephaly, The
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act suggest, however, that society is willing to absorb these costs to
prevent hospitals from discriminating against handicapped patients.
179. Mechanical life support would be removed, of course, once brain death occurred. This
situation arose in In re Helga Wanglie, PX-91-283 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 28, 1991), but it did not
involve an EMTALA claim.
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parents have a right to decide what treatment should be given to their
minor children. 8 0 However, the Fourth Circuit's application of
EMTALA allows parents to disregard completely the medical
judgment of their child's attending physicians.
EMTALA now infringes on a hospital's legitimate treatment
decisions, rather than merely providing an adequate first response to
a medical crisis, as was intended. Congress must prevent the
expanding ethical scope of EMTALA's protections by amending the
Act to effectuate its original antidumping purpose.
C. EMTALA's Effect on the RehabilitationAct, the ADA, and the
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984
The precedent established in Baby K could have a profound
effect on other federal laws that are better equipped to address the
treatment of terminally ill patients like anencephalics. Although the
district court in Baby K addressed the application of the
Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and the Child Abuse Amendments of
1984 in addition to EMTALA,181 the Fourth Circuit applied only
EMTALA.182 This decision seems unfortunate since these other laws
provide courts with a better legal framework for situations like Baby
K's.
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against
"otherwise qualified" handicapped individuals, solely by reason of
their handicap, under any program or activity receiving federal
funds.18 3 This Act defines a "handicapped individual" as "any person
who has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person's major life activities."'84 Thus, the
Rehabilitation Act would require a federally funded hospital to provide a terminally ill patient with respiratory support, regardless of
whether the patient was anencephalic or had AIDS.185 In contrast to
180. See Bowen v. American Hospital, 476 U.S. 610 (1986) (vesting primary decisional
responsibility in the parents under state law); Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1030 (holding that
parents have a constitutional right to make medical treatment decisions for their minor
children).
181. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1027-29.
182. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592 n.2.
183. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
184. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B).
185. See Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1028 (holding that the hospital's desire to withhold
ventilator treatment over Ms. H's objections would violate the Rehabilitation Act); Howe v. Hull,
874 F. Supp. 779, 789 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (stating that a physician could be held liable under the
Rehabilitation Act for failing to admit an AIDS patient); Woolfolk v. Duncan, 872 F. Supp. 1381,
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EMTALA, the Rehabilitation Act provides terminally ill patients with
better protection from the discriminatory practices of hospitals because this act focuses on the patient's disability rather than on the
86
attending symptoms of his or her condition.1
Similarly, the ADA protects terminally ill patients from hospitals that refuse to treat these patients because of their handicaps.
The ADA prohibits public accomodations from discriminating against
disabled individuals,187 and it traces the language of the
Rehabilitation Act, defining a "disability" as "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities," including disorders that affect "the neurological system,
musculoskeletal system, or sense organs among others."188 The ADA
therefore protects terminally ill patients, like anencephalics and AIDS
patients, from all public medical facilities 89 refusing to treat their
medical symptoms because of their disabilities.190
Like the
Rehabilitation Act, the ADA is better equipped than EMTALA to
address the treatment of terminally ill patients because the ADA's
protections focus on the patient's disability rather than on the symptoms of that disability. 19'
The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 also address terminal
illnesses and their treatment. The Child Abuse Amendments require
state child abuse laws to satisfy federal guidelines in order for state
agencies to receive federal funds. 92 Interestingly, the Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984 specifically recognize the sensitive issues
surrounding the treatment of anencephalic infants.
These

1390 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that the Rehabilitation Act prohibits a physician from refusing
medical care to an AIDS patient based solely upon the patient's disability).

186. One of the problems with the Fourth Circuit's decision in Baby K was that it
mechanically applied EMTALA's requirements to the infant's respiratory distress without
recognizing her underlying anencephalic condition. It is also important to note that the

Rehabilitation Act allows a plaintiff to sue the physician in addition to the hospital, unlike
EMTALA which does not allow a plaintiff to assert a cause of action against a physician.
Compare Howe, 874 F. Supp. at 789 (stating that a physician can be held liable under the
Rehabilitation Act) with 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 12182.
188. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1994).
189. The ADA's scope is even broader than the Rehabilitation Act because it applies to
public facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12182.
190. See Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1029 (holding that the ADA does not permit the denial of
ventilation to an anencephalic when this treatment would otherwise be provided to a baby
without disabilities); Woolfolk, 872 F. Supp. at 1389-91 (denying summary judgment to a
physician who allegedly refused to treat an HIV positive patient).
191. The ADA likewise allows a patient to sue a physician, unlike EMTALA. See Howe,
873 F. Supp. at 77 (holding that individual liability is consistent with the plain language of the
ADA).
192. 42 U.S.C § 5101.
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amendments encourage the states to protect the lives of handicapped
infants by requiring state child protective services to initiate civil
actions that will prevent hospitals from withholding medical
treatment from disabled infants with life-threatening conditions. 193
Yet, these amendments also recognize that aggressive life support is
sometimes inappropriate or inhumane.
Consequently, the
amendments allow the states to permit hospitals to withhold
treatment from infants such as anencephalics if that treatment would
merely prolong death.194
The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 provide federal guidance to the states, recognizing that state legislatures are the appropriate bodies to govern the treatment of handicapped children. By
indiscriminately applying EMTALA to the circumstances surrounding
Baby K, the Fourth Circuit made the Child Abuse Amendments of
1984, as well as the resultant state laws, irrelevant in the context of
anencephaly and other similar conditions. Certainly, Congress did
not intend EMTALA to invalidate the extensive legislative resources
expended at the federal and state levels to adequately address the
medical and ethical dimensions of neonatal treatment.
As this discussion has shown, the Baby K precedent has extended EMTALA's protections into areas better governed by other
federal laws like the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and the Child
Abuse Amendments of 1984.195 Responding to the Fourth Circuit's
statement in Baby K, Congress should therefore redress these policy
concerns by eliminating the inconsistency between EMTALA's legisla193. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(10)(C).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(10)(B). This subsection allows physicians to withhold treatment if,
in the physician's reasonable medical judgment:
(A) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose;
(B) the provision of such treatment would(i) merely prolong dying,
(ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's life-

threatening conditions; or
(iii) otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the infant; or
(C) the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of
the infant and the treatment itself under such circumstances would be inhumane.
Id. § 5106g(10).
195. In addition, any discrimination by a hospital based upon a patient's race, gender,
religion, or national origin would be governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988 & Supp. 1993) and Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-531 at 2 (cited in note 49)
(stating that Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in

any federal facility, and the Rehabilitation Act forbids federally funded facilities from
discriminating against persons based upon their handicaps); Stricker, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. at
1148 (cited in note 14) (arguing that federal courts inefficiently apply EMTAIA to conduct
already prohibited by other federal laws).
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tive history and its current language. Amending EMTALA to prohibit
patient dumping would not only allow the appropriate federal laws to
govern situations like those addressed in Baby K, but it would also
ameliorate any confusion over statutory interpretation of the Act and
limit the Act's ethical scope.
VI. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO EMTALA

The amendments proposed in this Note will remove the inconsistency between EMTALA's legislative history and its actual language by limiting the Act's application to indigent and uninsured
individuals. 196 The confusion over EMTALA's application centers
around the Act's application to "any individual." To prevent further
confusion and expansion, EMTALA's broad statutory language should
be limited to bring the Act in line with the congressional intent on
which it rests. Many courts have focused on the statutory usage of
"any individual" to support their broad application of EMTALA, yet
these courts have ignored the congressional intent encapsulated
within the Act's language. Section 1395dd(h) explicitly prohibits
hospitals from delaying the medical screening or necessary stabilizing
treatment while the hospital inquires about the patient's ability to
pay. Congress should use this section to emphasize its legislative
intent in addition to amending the overly broad phrase, "any
individual." Consequently, section 1395dd(a) should read as follows:
(a) Medical screening requirements.
(1) In general:

In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if
any indigent and uninsured individual (whether or not eligible for
benefits under this subchapter) comes to the emergency department

and a request is made on the individual's behalf for examination or
treatment for a medical condition, the hospital must provide for an
appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of
the hospital's emergency department, including ancillary services
196. This Note uses "indigent and uninsured individual" rather than "indigent or
uninsured individual" to prevent EMTALA from protecting patients who are able to pay for
their treatment but who do not have medical insurance. This amendment therefore only
protects those patients who are both indigent and uninsured. This approach focuses on the
patient's characteristics rather than the hospital's motive because it would be difficult for a
plaintiff to prove the hospital's motive for denying treatment. In contrast, the plaintiff can
easily prove his or her economic and insurance status. But see Stricker, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev.
at 1150-51 (cited in note 14) (proposing an amendment to § 1395dd(a) that would read: "No
hospital... shall refuse, because of improper economic motives, to provide any person with an
appropriate medical screening. . . "and recommending the use of a rebuttable presumption of
improper motive once the plaintiff builds a prima facie case).
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routinely available to the emergency department, to determine
whether or not an emergency condition
(within the meaning of sub197
section (e)(1) of this section) exists.
(2) No delay in screening.
A participating hospital may not delay provision of an appropriate
medical screening examination in order to inquire about an individual's method of payment or insurance status.198

Congress should also amend EMTALA's stabilization
requirement to remove the inconsistency between the Act's legislative
history and its current language. Section 1395dd(b) should therefore
read as follows:
(b) Necessary
stabilizing treatment
for emergency
medical
conditions and labor.
(1) In general.
If any indigent and uninsured individual (whether or not eligible for
benefits under this subchapter) comes to a hospital and the hospital
determines that the individual has an emergency medical condition,
the hospital must provide either(A) within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for such
further medical examination and such as may be required to stabilize the medical condition, or
(B) for transfer of the individual to another medical facility in accordance with subsection (c) of this section. 199

197. The current language of § 1395dd(a) reads as follows:
(a) Medical screening requirement.
In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any
individual (whether or not eligible for benefits under this subchapter) comes to the
emergency department and a request is made on the individual's behalf for examination
or treatment for a medical condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate
medical screening examination within the capabilities of the hospital's emergency
department, including ancillary services routinely available to the emergency
department, to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition (within the
meaning of subsection (e)(1) of this section) exists.
198. This amendment segments and transposes the language of the current § 1395dd(h),
which reads:
(h) No delay in examination or treatment.
A participating hospital may not delay provision of an appropriate medical
screening examination required under subsection (a) of this section or further medical
examination and treatment required under subsection (b) of this section in order to
inquire about the individual's method of payment or insurance status.
Amending EMTALA in this way will eliminate § 1395dd(h), and thus the current § 1395dd(i)
will become § 1395dd(h).
199. § 1395dd(b) currently reads:
(b) Necessary stabilizing treatment for emergency medical conditions and
labor.
(1) In general. If any individual (whether or not eligible for benefits under this
subchapter) comes to a hospital and the hospital determines that the
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(2) No delay in necessary stabilizing treatment.
A participating hospital may not delay provision of further medical examination and necessary stabilizing treatment in order to inquire about the
individual's method of payment or insurance status.

Many federal courts have been confused by the transfer requirements of EMTALA, interpreting these requirements to prohibit
unstabilized transfers when in fact section 1395dd(c) explicitly permits unstabilized transfers. Congress should dispel this confusion by
amending section 1395dd(c)(1) to read as follows:
(c)

Restrictions on unstabilized transfers.
(1) Rule.
If an indigent and uninsured individual at a hospital has an emergency medical condition that has not been stabilized (within the
meaning of subsection (e)(3)(B) of this section), the hospital may not
transfer the individual unless--20 0

Amending EMTALA in the preceding ways protects only patients who can show they are indigent and uninsured and who allege
that the hospital violated one or more of the Act's three requirements.
To ensure that these patients will pursue civil actions under the Act,
the civil enforcement section should be amended to award attorney's
fees to successful plaintiffs.20 1

Congress should amend section

1395dd(d)(2)(A) as follows:
(A) Personal harm.
Any indigent and uninsured individual who suffers harm as a di-

rect result of a participating hospital's violation of a requirement
of this section may, in a civil action against the participating
hospital, obtain those damages available for personal injury under the law of the State in which the hospital is located, and such

individual has an emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide
either

-

(A) within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for such further
medical examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the
medical condition, or
(B) for transfer of the individual to another medical facility in accordance with
subsection (c) of this section.
200. § 1395dd(c)(1) currently reads:
(c) Resticting transfers until individual stabilized.
(1) Rule. If an individual at a hospital has an emergency medical condition
which has not been stabilized (within the meaning of subsection (e)(3)(B) of
this section), the hospital may not transfer the individual unless201. See H. R. Rep. No. 100-531 at 19, 22 (cited in note 49) (recommending that EMTALA
or the regulations implementing it should award reasonable attorney's fees to successful
plaintiffs).
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equitable relief as is appropriate. Successful plaintiffs
may re20 2
cover reasonable attorney's fees in such an action.

Congress should amend the nondiscrimination section of
EMTALA to explicitly state that the Act is intended only to redress
economic discrimination. Section 1395dd(g) should thus be amended
to read as follows:
(g)

Nondiscrimination.
(1) Intent.
This Act is intended to redress only economic discrimination against
individuals with emergency medical conditions by participating hospitals. Any noneconomic discrimination against individuals with
emergency medical conditions is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; The Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 701; The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101;
and the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 5101.
(2) Acceptance of appropriate transfers.
A participating hospital that has specialized capabilities or facilities
(such as burn units, shock-trauma units, neonatal intensive care
units, or (with respect to rural areas) rpgional referral centers as
identified by the Secretary in regulation) shall not refuse to accept an
appropriate transfer of an indigent and uninsured individual who requires such specialized capabilities
or facilities if the hospital has the
20 3
capacity to treat the individual.

These proposed amendments to EMTALA should help correct
the unsettling ramifications of the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Baby K.
First, these amendments will prevent any further confusion over the
statutory interpretation of the Act because the plain language of the
amendments communicates the Act's antidumping purpose. Second,
these amendments will limit the ethical scope of EMTALA because
they express EMTALA's purpose to redress only economic
discrimination by hospitals; thus the clinical autonomy of a hospital

202. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) currently reads:
(A) Personal harm. Any individual who suffers harm as a direct result of a
participating hospital's violation of a requirement of this section may, in a civil action
against the participating hospital, obtain those damages available for personal injury
under the law of the State in which the hospital is located, and such equitable relief as is
appropriate.
203. § 1395dd(g) currently reads:
(g) Nondiscrimination. A participating hospital that has specialized capabilities or
facilities (such as burn units, shock-trauma units, neonatal intensive care units, or (with
respect to rural areas) regional referral centers as identified by the Secretary in
regulation [sic]) shall not refuse to accept an individual who requires such specialized
capabilities or facilities if the hospital has the capacity to treat the individual.
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and its physicians is not implicated by the Act's requirements. Last,
these amendments recognize that other federal laws, like the
Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and the Child Abuse Amendments of
1984, are better equipped to govern noneconomic discrimination by
hospitals and their physicians.
VII. CONCLUSION
To reiterate a point this Note has attempted to address comprehensively: the federal adjudication of EMTALA reveals that the
Act is in critical condition. Although its legislative history and implementation soundly reflect its antidumping purpose, the Act's plain
language created the potential for deterioration because it applies to
individuals who are not indigent and uninsured. The federal judiciary
recognized this weakness early on but exacerbated EMTALA's
condition by broadly construing the Act's protections. A disagreement
among the federal circuit courts has created a split of opinion over
whether EMTALA's antidiscriminatory history is relevant. Those
circuits that disregarded the Act's history allowed the Fourth Circuit
to inflict EMTALA's most serious injury to date in Baby K. This
precedent may prove fatal without immediate congressional
intercession. This Note therefore recommends the action necessary to
reverse EMTALA's current crisis. Amending EMTALA to protect only
indigent and uninsured individuals should heal the wound inflicted by
the Fourth Circuit and place EMTALA on the road to recovery.
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